Slosberg v. Giller

Facts

In May 2013, Robert Slosberg (P) filed a lawsuit alleging, among other things, that Suzanne Giller and Lynne Amy Seidner (Ds) unduly influenced David to create the trust that contained the in terrorem clause. David was 88 years old at the time. In January 2014, David created an irrevocable trust that, upon his death, would distribute a “nominal bequest” of $25,000 to P, with the remaining trust assets bequeathed to D. The trust instrument included an in terrorem clause: Should P, or his legal representative, or Ds, or their legal representatives[,] contest or initiate legal proceedings to contest the validity of this Trust or my Last Will and Testament … , or any provision from being carried out in accordance with its terms as I expressed (whether or not in good faith and with probable cause), then all the benefits provided herein for P and/or for Ds are revoked and annulled. About three months before he created the trust, David executed a will, which bequeathed the same “nominal” amount to P, left the remainder of his estate to Ds, and contained a substantially similar in terrorem clause. David died in August 2014. In November 2015, P filed a third amended complaint claiming that D unduly influenced David to create the irrevocable trust and that the trust was therefore invalid. In May 2016, the trial court granted Ds‘ motion, ruling that there was no evidence of undue influence; declared that the trust was therefore valid; and concluded that under the in terrorem clause, P had forfeited any benefits from the trust. The parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals-without any mention of the in terrorem clause-reversed the grant of summary judgment because the trial court had improperly “discredited” and “limited the scope of P's evidence” of undue influence. In March 2019, Ds filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting that the in-terrorem clause barred P from raising an undue-influence claim in the first place. The trial court denied Ds' motion, ruling that the in-terrorem clause did not bar P's undue influence claim. At the close of the evidence, Ds moved for a directed verdict arguing that the in-terrorem clause barred P's undue-influence claim. The trial court denied the motion. The jury found that Ds had unduly influenced David to create the trust. The court ruled that the trust instrument was void. The court imposed a constructive trust, granting P one-third of the amount in David's trust account, which contained about $1,449,000 at the time of trial. The trial court also concluded that P was entitled to pre-and post-judgment interest. Ds appealed, contending that the in terrorem clause barred P's undue-influence claim and resulted in his forfeiture of trust benefits. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversed the trial court's judgment, and remanded the case. It held that the in-terrorem clause “barred any claim attacking the trust, including a claim that the trust was executed as the result of undue influence.” P appealed. 

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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