Shinn v. Ramirez

142 S. Ct. 1718 (2021)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Ramirez (P) fatally stabbed his girlfriend, Mary Ann Gortarez, and her 15-year-old daughter, Candie, in their home. Ramirez (P) stabbed Mary Ann 18 times in the neck with a pair of scissors, and Candie 15 times in the neck with a box cutter. There was physical evidence that Ramirez (P) had raped Candie, and Ramirez (P) later admitted that he had sex with the child on the night of the murders and four times before. Ramirez (P) was convicted of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder. Ramirez (P) was sentenced to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on direct review. Ramirez (P) was sentenced to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on direct review, Ramirez (P) filed his first petition for state postconviction relief. The petition did not raise the present issue: that Ramirez’s (P) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for “failing to conduct a complete mitigation investigation” or “obtain and present available mitigation evidence at sentencing.” He subsequently filed a successive state habeas petition, which the state court summarily denied as untimely under Arizona law. It raised ineffective assistance of counsel. Ramirez (P) also petitioned the District Court. The District Court held that Ramirez (P) had procedurally defaulted his ineffective-assistance claim by failing to raise it before the Arizona courts in a timely fashion. The District Court permitted Ramirez (P) to file several declarations and other evidence not presented to the state court to support his request to excuse his procedural default. The District Court excused the procedural default but rejected Ramirez’s (P) ineffective-assistance claim on the merits. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. It held that the state postconviction counsel’s failure to raise and develop the trial-ineffective-assistance claim was cause to forgive the procedural default. It held that Ramirez’s (P) underlying trial-ineffective-assistance claim was substantial and that he, therefore, had suffered prejudice. The court remanded the case for further factfinding because, in its view, Ramirez (P) was “entitled to evidentiary development to litigate the merits of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.” Shinn (D) petitioned for rehearing en banc: the remand for additional evidentiary development violated 28 U. S. C. §2254(e)(2).

Jones (P) repeatedly beat his girlfriend’s 4-year-old daughter, Rachel Gray, and ruptured her small intestine. She also sustained several injuries to her vagina and labia consistent with sexual assault. Jones (P) drove Rachel to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead on arrival. She died of peritonitis. Jones (P) was convicted of sexual assault, three counts of child abuse, and felony murder. The trial judge sentenced Jones (P) to death, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on direct review. Jones (P) petitioned for state postconviction relief. He alleged ineffective assistance by his trial counsel. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied relief. Jones (P) filed a habeas petition in the District Court. It held that Jones’ (P) trial-ineffective-assistance claim was procedurally defaulted. Jones (P), invoked his postconviction counsel’s ineffective assistance as grounds to forgive the default. Jones (P) also moved to supplement the undeveloped state-court record. Ibid. The District Court held a 7-day evidentiary hearing with more than 10 witnesses and decided to forgive Jones’ (P) procedural default. The court then held from the new evidence that Jones’ (P) trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. D appealed, arguing that §2254(e)(2) did not permit the evidentiary hearing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that §2254(e)(2) did not apply because Jones’ (P) state postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to develop the state-court record for Jones’ (P) trial-ineffective-assistance claim. D appealed. D claims that 28 U. S. C. §2254(e)(2) does not permit a federal court to order evidentiary development simply because postconviction counsel is alleged to have negligently failed to develop the state-court record.