Shafir v. Steele

727 N.E.2d 1140 (2000)

Facts

D publishes a newspaper called The Advocate. In 1993, D and his business entities were in default on loans from Shawmut Bank (Shawmut), secured by a mortgage on the property at issue in this case. A loan restructuring agreement was worked out between Shawmut and D. Shawmut would foreclose on the property and D's children, through a trust, would bid at least $175,000 at the foreclosure sale. If a third party outbid the trust, the restructuring agreement would be null and void. Shawmut had valued the property at $275,000. The foreclosure sale was held on July 6, 1993. P's bid of $ 240,000 was $5,000 higher than the highest bid made by d's children. P paid a $10,000 deposit and signed a purchase and sale agreement with Shawmut. That evening D sought revenge. D went to P's movie theater and stood 'a little too close' to P and, conveying 'a sense of menace,' told her that he was 'not very well.' On July 8, 1993, D's newspaper published an editorial that essentially accused P of bidding at the sale as retribution for The Advocate's refusing to drop its 'Screen Scene' column which had once been critical of P's movie theater. It concluded with a statement implying that P intended to muzzle the newspaper. D requested a face-to-face meeting. The meeting took place on July 11, 1993. D was 'quite distraught' and did not understand and kept insisting that the building 'was his.' Near the end of the meeting, P offered to have D buy out her position for $15,000, which D rejected. The next day D delivered an unsigned legal complaint prepared by D's attorney for filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court. The complaint charged P with fraud, extortion, and malicious interference with an advantageous contract (between D and Shawmut). On July 26, 1993, P's attorney sent a letter to Shawmut declaring her intention not to close the sale and requesting the return of her $10,000. Shawmut refused to return the deposit and maintained its right to seek recovery of additional expenses. P sued D for defamation and intentional interference with contractual relations. The trial court denied D's motion for a directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after a jury found D liable to P. D appealed