Serfass v. United States

420 U.S. 377 (1975)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D, whose military service had been deferred for two years while he was in the Peace Corps, was ordered to report for induction on January 18, 1971. On December 29, 1970, he requested the form for conscientious objectors and after submitting the completed form to his local board, he requested an interview. D met with the local board on January 13, 1971, and thereafter he was informed by letter that it had considered his entire Selective Service file, had 'unanimously agreed that there was no change over which D had no control,' and had therefore 'decided not to re-open D's file.' D was informed that he was 'still under Orders to report for Induction on January 18, 1971, at 5:15 A.M.' D appeared at the examining station and refused induction on January 18. A grand jury returned an indictment charging D with willfully failing to report for and submit to induction into the Armed Forces, in violation of 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a). D pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. The trial date was set for January 9, 1973. D filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the local board did not state adequate reasons for its refusal to reopen his file. D also moved 'to postpone the trial which was now scheduled for January 9, 1973, for the reason that a Motion to Dismiss has been simultaneously filed and the expeditious administration of justice will be served best by considering the Motion prior to trial.' On January 5 the District Court granted D's motion to continue the trial and set a date for oral argument on the motion to dismiss the indictment. On July 16, 1973, the court ordered that the indictment be dismissed. The material facts were derived from d's affidavit, from his Selective Service file, and from the oral stipulation of counsel at the argument 'that the information which D submitted to the Board establishes a prima facie claim for conscientious objector status based upon late crystallization.' The District Court held that dismissal of the indictment was appropriate because D was 'entitled to full consideration of his claim prior to assignment to combatant training and service,' and because the local board's statement of reasons for refusing to reopen his Selective Service file was 'sufficiently ambiguous to be reasonably construed as a rejection on the merits, thereby prejudicing his right to in-service review.' P appealed. D moved to quash the appeal because further prosecution was prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals held that since D had not waived his right to a jury trial, and no jury had been empaneled and sworn at the time the District Court ruled on his motion to dismiss the indictment, jeopardy had not attached and the dismissal was an appealable order. Because of an apparent conflict among the Courts of Appeals concerning the question of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits an appeal under §3731 from a pretrial order dismissing an indictment in these circumstances, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.