Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. De Los Santos

Facts

Seattle Stevedore Co. (Seattle), pursuant to its undertaking with D, was engaged in loading a cargo of wheat into a hold of the M/S Jalaratna. A winch, part of the ship's gear, was being used to lower wooden pallets, each containing seventy 50-pound sacks of wheat, into the hold. P and three other longshoremen were in the hold. Their task was to remove sacks of wheat from the pallet and properly stow them. The longshoreman operator relied on another longshoreman, to signal him when to start and stop the winch while lowering a pallet of sacks into the hold. The braking mechanism of the winch was malfunctioning. When 'stopped' it would continue to drop for several feet before coming to a complete stop. While a pallet was being lowered, the hatch tender signaled the winch operator to stop the descent of the load. The brake was applied, but the pallet did not stop before striking a pallet jack The hatch tender signaled the operator to raise the pallet about 15 feet and, believing that the remaining sacks on the pallet were secure enough not to fall, permitted P and the other men to clear away the spilled sacks then lying below in the hold. Some minutes later, however, more sacks fell from the pallet, striking and injuring P. There was dispute as to whether the additional sacks fell because the suspended pallet was swinging back and forth or because while the pallet was suspended the braking mechanism slipped on three or four occasions, each time requiring the operator to raise it again, thus working loose the additional sacks that fell on P. The District Court held that the negligence standards governing the longshoreman's action against a shipowner under § 905 (b) are best expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 343 and 343A (1965), which purport to state the prevailing or preferred rules governing the liability of a possessor of land to an invitee. The court held that 'a shipowner is not liable for dangerous conditions created by the stevedore's negligence while the stevedore [is] in exclusive control over the manner and area of the work . . . , nor is the shipowner under a duty to warn the stevedore or his employees of dangers or open and obvious defects which are known to the stevedore or his employees or which are so obvious and apparent that they may reasonably be expected to discover them.' The court held that the premises were in the exclusive control of Seattle during the loading operation and that even if D knew or should have known of the defective winch, the condition of the winch 'was open and obvious to P and 'the fact that plaintiff undertook his actions free from any direction by the defendant while recognizing that the circumstances were so dangerous, is such that D cannot be held liable as a matter of law.' The court also found that the winch was a remote cause-of-fact relationship to P's accident and could not have been the proximate cause thereof as a matter of law.' Summary judgment was granted and P appealed. The court of appeals held that Sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement were improper measures of the shipowner's liability for negligence under § 905 (b). in that they incorporated notions of contributory negligence and assumption of risk that were inapplicable under the maritime law. The appeals court held that 'a vessel is subject to liability for injuries to longshoremen working on or near the vessel caused by conditions on the vessel if, but only if, the shipowner (a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover, the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such longshoremen, and the shipowner fails to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to protect the longshoremen against the danger. The Appeals Court stated that several material facts were in dispute as to whether the shipowner knew or should have known of the defective winch; whether Seattle was in exclusive control of the loading in the sense that only Seattle could have repaired the winch; whether the defective operation of the winch had caused the initial spillage of the sacks, thus necessitating a cleanup, or had later been the proximate cause of the additional sacks falling from the pallet and injuring P. D appealed. 

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

© 2007-2024 ABN Study Partner.