Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators Of Texas, L.L.C.

997 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2021)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P was employed as a land-based welder by Smart (D), a contract welding firm engaged in steel fabrication, repairs to drilling equipment, and general contract welding work. D's work is performed to meet the demands of its customers on land and sometimes on jack-up drilling barges. P worked on the Enterprise jack-up barge WFD 350 for 48 days doing welding work on a discrete repair job. The entire time he worked on this vessel, it was jacked up so that the deck of the barge was level with Gabby's Dock in Sabine Pass, Texas, and separated from the dock by a gangplank. P could take two steps on the gangplank, and he was ashore. He commuted from his home to the vessel daily. His time on the WFD 350 comprised approximately 72 percent of his total work time with D. P worked 13 days on the Enterprise jack-up barge 263. His work on this vessel comprised approximately 19 percent of his time in D's employment. Enterprise 263 was located in West Cameron Block 38 on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). He was sent as part of a D crew that was contracted to perform repairs necessary to get the vessel in condition to satisfy regulatory requirements so that the rig could begin drilling operations at a new drilling site on the OCS. P was aboard the rig when it was moved by tugboats to the new drilling location, South Timbalier Block 125 on the OCS. P performed welding and related work. P fell and sustained the injury that is the subject of this suit. P left the employ of D after his injury and, as far as the record shows, did no more work on Enterprise vessels. P sued D in state court under the Jones Act. D removed the suit to federal court. The court held that P failed to establish a substantial connection in terms of the nature of his work to the Enterprise fleet of jack-up barges he worked aboard. The court held that P's work contributed to the function of these vessels which satisfied prong one of the seaman-status test. The court held that because P spent more than 30 percent of his work time with D working on those two barges, he met the substantial connection requirement as to duration. But, because less than 30 percent of his work on the two vessels was performed away from the dock, he did not satisfy the nature element of the substantiality requirement, and therefore P was not a seaman. P appealed. The panel held that P satisfied the requirements for seaman status. The case was voted en banc.