Salter v. Hamiter

887 So. 2d 230 (2004)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D and Mary Ellen Knowles became business associates and good friends. They engaged in many business ventures together in which Knowles acted as the bookkeeper. In October 1966, Knowles gave D power of attorney over all of her assets. On March 13, 1967, Knowles executed a will leaving everything she owned to D. At some point after she had executed the will, Knowles deeded all of the real property she owned in Choctaw County, Escambia County, Dale County, Conecuh County, and Covington County to D. The deeds at issue are located in Conecuh County and Covington County, totaling approximately 1,000 acres. Knowles executed the three deeds in November 1967 and presented them to her attorney and told him that it was her desire to transfer the title of the described properties to D, and she wanted to know if the deeds 'looked alright.' The attorney testified that he explained to Knowles the consequences of not recording the deeds and further explained that 'delivery' of the deeds to the grantee was an essential element for the conveyance of real property. A couple of months later while at the hospital, she telephoned her attorney and asked him to come to the hospital to witness her delivery of the deeds to D and to make sure that the delivery of the deeds was a 'good delivery.' When D and the attorney arrived Knowles retrieved the deeds from her purse and handed them to D. The attorney advised her that what had just transpired was 'a sufficient delivery of the deeds.' Knowles requested at this time that D not record the deeds until after her death. Salter retained physical possession of the deeds. Afterward, D managed the timber property on the lands conveyed to him by the deeds, possessed keys to all of the gates located on the properties, and hunted on the properties. The properties remained in Knowles's name for purposes of ad valorem tax assessments; however, the invoices for those taxes were mailed to one of two businesses operated jointly by D and Knowles. There is also evidence indicating that, following the delivery of the deeds to D, Knowles sold timber off and leased mineral rights to the properties described in the deeds; she also sold parcels of land included in the properties described in the deeds. Several of the purchasers testified that D knew of and consented to those transactions and even stated that Knowles would not make a decision concerning a sale without D's consent. Knowles executed another will; the will contained no reference to the real property located in Conecuh County and Covington County. Knowles told her attorney that she had already deeded most of her property to D and that she was aware that she did not have title to any of the real property she had conveyed to D. D recorded the deeds several days after Knowles's death on May 28, 2000. The representatives of Knowles's estate, Harold Hamiter and Gillis Ralls (Ps), filed the present action seeking to have the three deeds declared void. Ps claims the deeds were not properly delivered, (2) they violated the statute of wills, and (3) D was barred by the doctrine of laches because he had failed to assert his claim to ownership within 20 years of the date of the execution of the three deeds. The court declared all three deeds void. It held that the deeds 'were intended to be the equivalent of a will' and that, 'as a will, none of the three deeds [met] the requirements of the statute of wills.' It held that 'there was no intent by Knowles to vest title, ownership, and control of her lands in D at the time of the purported delivery of the deeds at issue.' It also held that 'D's lack of action until after the death of Knowles [indicated] lack of present acceptance of the delivery.' D appealed.