Nature of the Case
To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.
Facts
W filed a complaint against H seeking relief from a prior divorce judgment by means of an independent equity action and pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 828 (1974). W alleged that fraud perpetrated by H had resulted in a divorce judgment that was manifestly unconscionable. H's motion for summary judgment was granted. and W appealed. In the first action, W filed for divorce from H on June 30, 1994, following twenty-eight years of marriage. The value of H's business was at issue. Based on all of the information that was presented, the judge concluded that the fair market value of H's interest was $4,912,717. The judge awarded H 100% of the outstanding shares but ordered him to pay the wife 30% of the established value, or $1,473,815, in annual installments over five years. W wanted cash instead of stock. The judgment became absolute on May 23, 1996. In January 1999, nearly three years after issuance of the divorce judgment, Lucent Technologies, Inc. (Lucent), announced that it was acquiring H's in exchange for 12.88 million shares of Lucent, then valued at $1.48 billion. The sale was completed by March 1, 1999, and the company became a wholly owned subsidiary of Lucent. W then complaint seeking relief from the prior divorce judgment by means of an independent equity action and pursuant to rule 60 (b) (6). She claimed irregularities in the huge disparity between the $4.9 million valuation in 1996 and its $1.48 billion sale price in 1999. W claimed that the gross discrepancy between the estimated fair market value in 1996 and its established fair market value in 1999 could not be explained by any market condition, by the economy, or by any internal changes in the company, including its product line or marketing strategy. It was W's contention that this discrepancy was directly attributable to the husband's misrepresentations and omissions during the divorce proceedings of material facts pertaining to the company's financial outlook, which constituted fraud and denied the wife her day in court. W had plenty of evidence that H told a different story in divorce court than what was told to the rest of the world about company prospects. The judge first concluded that, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to W, there was no evidence that she had been defrauded by H. Furthermore, even if she had been able to present evidence of fraud by the husband, there was no exception in rule 60 (b) that would allow the judge to grant the wife relief more than one year after entry of the divorce judgment. The Court entered a judgment of dismissal on June 6, 2000. W appealed.
Support@ bsmsphd.com
Casebriefs Co