Nature of the Case
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Facts
In 1964, Texas (P) charged D with fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services. The charged offense was a felony punishable by a minimum of 2 years and a maximum of 10 years in the Texas Department of Corrections. In 1969 P charged D with passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36, a crime punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary for not less than two nor more than five years. In 1973 Rummel was charged with obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. The charged offense was designated 'felony theft,' which, by itself, was punishable by confinement in a penitentiary for not less than 2 nor more than 10 years. P chose to proceed under P's recidivist statute and cited in the indictment his 1964 and 1969 convictions as requiring imposition of a life sentence if d were convicted of the charged offense. A jury convicted Rummel of felony theft and also found as true the allegation that he had been convicted of two prior felonies. The trial court imposed a life sentence. State courts rejected D's direct appeal as well as his subsequent collateral attacks on his imprisonment. D filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his life sentence was so disproportionate to the crimes he had committed as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court rejected this claim and noted that D's sentence could not be viewed as life imprisonment because he would be eligible for parole in approximately 12 years. The Court of Appeals reversed. D's case was reheard by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc. That court vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas corpus relief on D's Eighth Amendment claim. It reasoned that D would be eligible for parole within 12 years of his initial confinement. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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