Rogers v. Tennessee

532 U.S. 451 (2001)

Facts

Rogers (D) was convicted in Tennessee state court of second-degree murder. D stabbed his victim, James Bowdery, with a butcher knife on May 6, 1994. One of the stab wounds penetrated Bowdery's heart. During surgery to repair the wound to his heart, Bowdery went into cardiac arrest but was resuscitated and survived the procedure. James developed a condition known as 'cerebral hypoxia,' which results from a loss of oxygen to the brain. His higher brain functions had ceased, and he slipped into and remained in a coma until August 7, 1995, when he died from a kidney infection (a common complication experienced by comatose patients). Approximately 15 months had passed between the stabbing and James's death which, according to the undisputed testimony of the county medical examiner, was caused by cerebral hypoxia ' `secondary to a stab wound to the heart.' ' D was found guilty. The statute, which makes no mention of the year and a day rule, defines criminal homicide simply as 'the unlawful killing of another person which may be first-degree murder, second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide.' D appealed his conviction to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that, despite its absence from the statute, the year and a day rule persisted as part of the common law of Tennessee and, as such, precluded his conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected that argument and affirmed the conviction. The court held that Tennessee's Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (1989 Act), which abolished all common law defenses in criminal actions in Tennessee, had abolished the rule. The court also rejected petitioner's further contention that the legislative abolition of the rule constituted an ex post facto violation, noting that the 1989 Act had taken effect five years before petitioner committed his crime. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed on different grounds. The court observed that it had recognized the viability of the year and a day rule in Tennessee in Percer v. State, 118 Tenn. 765, 103 S. W. 780 (1907), and that, 'despite the paucity of case law' on the rule in Tennessee, 'both parties ... agree that the ... rule was a part of the common law of this State.' Turning to the rule's present status, the court noted that the rule has been legislatively or judicially abolished by the 'vast majority' of jurisdictions recently to have considered the issue. The court concluded that, contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, the 1989 Act had not abolished the rule. After reviewing the justifications for the rule at common law, however, the court found that the original reasons for recognizing the rule no longer exist. Accordingly, the court abolished the rule as it had existed at common law in Tennessee and upheld D’s conviction. The court disagreed with petitioner's contention that application of its decision abolishing the rule to his case would violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. Those constitutional provisions, the court observed, refer only to legislative Acts.