Rios v. State Of Maryland

974 A.2d 366 (2009)

Facts

D was charged with three counts of first-degree assault, three counts of second-degree assault, three counts of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, reckless endangerment (Count X), and one count of unlawfully carrying a handgun. D through his counsel, Schwartz, entered into extensive plea negotiations. Prior to the week beginning April 7, 2008, the Assistant State's Attorney assigned to the case, ['the prosecutor'], had offered D a plea to one count of possession of a handgun and one count of reckless endangerment, with time served. The next day, D, through counsel, rejected the offer and told [the prosecutor] that he could recommend an Alford plea to reckless endangerment, with time served. The prosecutor agreed to such a plea offer. Counsel informed [the prosecutor] that he would discuss the matter with his client and get back to him. Counsel met with D who agreed to accept the plea offer. On Friday, April 18, D's counsel left several messages on [the prosecutor's] voicemail, regarding acceptance of the plea offer. A message was again left on Monday, April 21. On Tuesday, April 22, 2008, [the prosecutor] returned the call. Counsel made the following inquiry to [the prosecutor]: 'Would you consider allowing a nolo plea to reckless?' [The prosecutor] informed Schwartz that he could not agree to a nolo plea. He stated that he was getting pressure from the police and his superiors to not make a plea offer. Counsel informed the prosecutor that his client would accept the plea offer made: Alford plea to reckless endangerment, with time served. [The prosecutor] informed counsel that he was meeting with the police and his superiors and did not think he could make any plea offer at the time. Later in the week, [the prosecutor] called and informed D's counsel that no plea offer would be made. On May 23, 2008, Rios filed a 'Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement and to Dismiss All Counts of the Indictment Except for the Tenth Count,' arguing that the circuit court should, pursuant to an Alford plea, sentence D to time served for reckless endangerment and dismiss the remaining counts. The court stated it was called upon to determine whether or not the words [']would you consider allowing a nolo to reckless['] constitutes a counteroffer and might be accepted as a rejection here, relieving the obligation upon P to accept any subsequent effort at forming a contract. The court does not consider the statement to be a mere inquiry or a mere effort to modify. An Alford plea is different from a plea of nolo contendere. A defendant may plead nolo contendere only with the consent of the court. That is an important distinction. The court is satisfied that the invitation that there will be an examination of nolo was, indeed, a counteroffer. That was a rejection of the offer and D was no longer bound to a plea agreement on the basis of the offer that existed prior to communication of the request that nolo be considered. The court, considering the distinctions between a plea of nolo and an Alford plea, finds that the language used by -- the words used by Schwartz were not a positive unequivocal acceptance of the P's offer to allow D to plea -- to offer an Alford plea. And the court denies the motion to enforce the plea agreement. D appealed.