P was interested in operating a nursery-swine facility. D enacted an ordinance that limits the number of pigs that he may have on his property to 1,999. D counted small young pigs, in the same manner, it counted live large pigs. An economically viable nursery-swine operation must house approximately 4,200 pigs, and P asked D for a variance regarding the definition of animal unit so as to allow a nursery-swine operation at his site. P tried to get nursery swine counted as .5, but that amendment failed a Commission vote. P kept lobbying the Commission but to no avail. P started operations in the hope of a successful outcome at the Commission, but that was wishful thinking. P got a civil infraction for having more pigs than allowed on his land. P sued D for equal protection and due process and a taking. D removed the case to federal court. The district court rejected P's facial substantive due process and equal protection challenge, reasoning that 'reducing odor is a legitimate end of government zoning action,' and that 'it is also rational to determine . . . that swine are animals which should be treated as prime smell-producers, and should be weighed as an entire animal unit.' With regard to P's 'as applied' substantive due process and equal protection challenge, the district court explained that 'the P's desire that the D consider his swine as fractional animal units based on their smaller size is understandable.' It then concluded that D's failure to distinguish between swine of different sizes was not irrational in relation to its goal of odor reduction. It granted summary judgment to D. P appealed.