Reynolds v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Division, Litton Systems, Inc.

788 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1986)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P worked as a shipfitter for D. D contracted to build the USS Ticonderoga. D had to conduct certain sea trials prior to handing the ship over to the Navy. Litton took the ship to sea in May 1982, to execute the required sea trials. P volunteered to sail on the ship, and he was assigned to the steward's department where his duties were to wash and stow the mess utensils. P was washing pots and pans when the ship began to execute high-speed turns. Soapy water spilled out of the sink and onto the deck. Pslipped in the soapy water and injured his knee. P brought suit to recover for his knee injury, under the Jones Act negligence and under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, (LHWCA). A federal magistrate granted D's motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing all of Reynolds' claims except the LHWCA action. The district court also granted D's motion for summary judgment on the LHWCA action. P applied for and has received compensation from Litton under the LHWCA. P appealed. P contends that there is a disputed question of fact as to whether P's injury occurred within the jurisdictional limits of the LHWCA: that is, whether his injury occurred while the Ticonderoga was on the 'navigable waters of the United States.' P contends that if the injury occurred while the ship was outside the three-mile territorial limit, then the LHWCA does not apply, meaning that P is not covered under the LHWCA and is free to sue D under a theory of general maritime negligence. The compensation Reynolds has received under the LHWCA provides his exclusive remedy unless he falls within an exception delineated by § 905(b) of the Act. Section 905, entitled 'Exclusiveness of Liability,' provides that, under some circumstances, employees injured by a vessel's negligence may bring suit against the vessel. The Act defines 'vessel' as 'any vessel . . . said vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, charter or bare boat charterer, master, officer, or crew member.' 33 U.S.C. § 902(21). p claims that at the time he was injured, he was not engaged in 'shipbuilding' activity but was rather performing duties of a steward; and that D was an 'operator' of the Ticonderoga and therefore amenable to suit under § 905(b) as the 'vessel.'