The parties are brothers. Ida M. Rhoads was their aunt. Upon her death, D probated a Last Will and Testament dated March 22, 1956. P filed a claim against the estate in the amount of $53,500, which D rejected in writing on October 10, 1960. P filed suit on April 7, 1961. P claimed in his declaration that he had rendered personal services of substantial value to the Woodland Lumber Company, a corporation of which both he and Aunt Ida were officers, directors, and stockholders, from 1930 until its dissolution in 1952 and that he had given advice to Ida individually in connection with her business and personal affairs from 1930 until the date of her death in 1959. P introduced two written documents, not under seal, both of which are dated December 2, 1949. The two documents were determined to be genuine. P testified that from 1930 until 1952 he was the 'territorial manager for an outside business' located in Baltimore, Maryland, the nature of which was not made clear, from which he earned 'approximately $ 4,500 to $ 5,000 a year.' P testified that he also had an association with Woodland Lumber Company 'from 1930 until it went out of business' in 1952. P regularly attended corporation meetings, and, from time to time, served as a director, chairman of the board of directors, president, general manager, and auditor. Certified letters from a Philadelphia bank establish that P was authorized to draw checks on the company's bank account. Certified copies of the articles of incorporation and of the minutes of various corporate meetings were introduced into evidence. The ownership of the company's stock was testified to be as follows: Mrs. Susanna Campbell 25 shares; Jeremiah T. Robinhold 25 shares; P 15 shares Ida M. Rhoads 685 shares. P testified that he received 'not one cent' from the corporation during its entire existence and that he had 'no salary arrangement whatever' with it. As part of the deal P testified that he and Ida agreed he would be paid later on with a contract 'my aunt and myself had made.' He also testified that he did not 'intend to work all these years for nothing,' and that the work he did would be valued at more than $ 150.00 a month 'for the responsibility.' this evidence was subsequently stricken out by the trial court upon the motion of D. There is no evidence admitted by the trial court tending to show what 'advice' or services plaintiff rendered to the decedent 'concerning her personal affairs.' The court ordered that judgment be entered in favor of P, but only as to services performed during the period from 1930 to 1949. The court reached the conclusion that P was not entitled to judgment for services allegedly performed for the period December 2, 1949, to December 30, 1959 by the following process of reasoning: 1. The contract did not recite the performance of any services after December 2, 1949, nor did it contain a promise to perform any subsequent to that date. 2. Testimony by P as to 'future services' would contravene the provisions of Article 35, Section 3 of the Annotated Code. 3. Since there was no proof by someone other than P with regard to services performed after December 2, 1949, for the decedent, P failed to establish a prima facie case as to those 'future services.' P got the judgment for $34,200 and D appealed.