Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins

Facts

At D, a nationwide professional accounting partnership, a senior manager becomes a candidate for partnership when the partners in her local office submit her name as a candidate. All of the other partners in the firm are then invited to submit written comments on each candidate -- either on a 'long' or a 'short' form, depending on the partner's degree of exposure to the candidate. After reviewing the comments and interviewing the partners the Admissions Committee makes a recommendation. The Policy Board then decides whether to submit the candidate's name to the entire partnership for a vote, to 'hold' her candidacy, or to reject her. There are no fixed guidelines. There is no limit on the number of persons whom it will admit to the partnership in any given year. Of the 662 partners at the firm at that time, 7 were women. Of the 88 persons proposed for partnership that year, only P was a woman. Forty-seven of these candidates were admitted to the partnership, 21 were rejected, and 20 -- including P -- were 'held' for reconsideration the following year. Thirteen of the 32 partners who had submitted comments on P supported her bid for partnership. Three partners recommended that her candidacy be placed on hold, eight stated that they did not have an informed opinion about her, and eight recommended that she be denied partnership. P had 'played a key role in P's successful effort to win a multi-million dollar contract with the Department of State.' At trial, one official from the State Department described her as 'extremely competent, intelligent,' 'strong and forthright, very productive, energetic and creative.' P's aggressiveness apparently spilled over into abrasiveness. Long before her bid for partnership, partners evaluating her work had counseled her to improve her relations with staff members. Virtually all of the partners' negative remarks about P -- even those of partners supporting her -- had to do with her 'inter-personal skills.' P was sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with, and impatient with staff. Some of the partners reacted negatively to P's personality because she was a woman. She was described as 'macho' and she 'overcompensated for being a woman.' Several partners criticized her use of profanity; in response, one partner suggested that those partners objected to her swearing only 'because it's a lady using foul language.' Thomas Beyer advised, that Hopkins should 'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.' Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist and Associate Professor of Psychology testified at trial that the partnership selection process at D was likely influenced by sex stereotyping. Her testimony focused not only on the overtly sex-based comments of partners but also on gender-neutral remarks, made by partners who knew P only slightly, that were intensely critical of her. P's uniqueness (as the only woman in the pool of candidates) and the subjectivity of the evaluations made it likely that sharply critical remarks such as these were the product of sex stereotyping -- although Fiske admitted that she could not say with certainty whether any particular comment was the result of stereotyping. In previous years, other female candidates for partnership also had been evaluated in sex-based terms. Judge Gesell found that D legitimately emphasized interpersonal skills in its partnership decisions, and also found that the firm had not fabricated its complaints about P's interpersonal skills as a pretext for discrimination. Although there were male candidates who lacked these skills but who were admitted to partnership, the judge found that these candidates possessed other, positive traits that P lacked. The judge held that D had unlawfully discriminated on the basis of sex by consciously giving credence and effect to partners' comments that resulted from sex stereotyping. The judge held that D could avoid equitable relief by proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have placed P's candidacy on hold even absent this discrimination. The judge decided that the firm had not carried this heavy burden. The Court of Appeals affirmed and held that even if a plaintiff proves that discrimination played a role in an employment decision, the defendant will not be found liable if it proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination. An employer is not deemed to have violated Title VII if it proves that it would have made the same decision in the absence of an impermissible motive, whereas under the District Court's approach, the employer's proof in that respect only avoids equitable relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. According to D, an employer violates Title VII only if it gives decisive consideration to an employee's gender, race, national origin, or religion in making a decision that affects that employee. Even if a plaintiff shows that her gender played a part in an employment decision, it is still her burden to show that the decision would have been different if the employer had not discriminated. In P's view, an employer violates the statute whenever it allows one of these attributes to play any part in an employment decision. Once a plaintiff shows that this occurred the employer's proof that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination can serve to limit equitable relief but not to avoid a finding of liability.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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