Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co. Mich. Sup. Ct,

421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176 (1984)

Facts

P who was employed as foreman of the parts department at an automobile dealership, sustained a hip injury in an accident involving the use of a forklift manufactured by P and sold to P's employer in 1952. The forklift was a stand-up or walking type rather than a riding or sit down variety. It was operated by lifting its handle up, much like the handle of a wagon. It weighed about two thousand pounds and was powered by a large battery, which had to be recharged every night. The machine was equipped with a hand-controlled 'dead-man' switch which normally prevented it from moving if the operator let go of the handle or controls. P was sixty-three years old at the time of the accident, occasionally operated the forklift and had never been formally instructed as to its operation by his employer. P was aware of and had previously experienced problems with the machine. After use for five or six hours, the battery charge would run down, and the machine would operate erratically. When the battery was low, the machine was subject to power surges which he said could throw a person off balance if care was not taken. Prior to his accident, the machine had broken through the garage door of the dealership five or six times due to such power surges. P testified that he was aware at the time that the battery charge on the forklift was running low. When the machine experienced a power surge, he lost his footing and fell to the ground. P received extensive treatment for multiple fractures of his left hip. P sued alleging negligence, failure to warn, and breach of implied warranty. A jury verdict in favor of D was entered and was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The reversal was based upon a finding that the trial court abused its discretion when it prevented P's expert on human factors from expressing his opinion on the design of the machine in question because he had no experience with that type of machine. The court based its reversal upon a finding that the excluded testimony was integrally related to P's theory of the case which was a design defect. P's contention was that the design of the forklift failed to properly incorporate the operator as a 'human factor' into the machine's function, specifically because it did not provide a seat or platform for the operator. P requested separate jury instructions on implied warranty and negligence theories. The court instructed the jury on a unified standard of liability by using an amalgam of the common elements of proof under the implied warranty and negligence theories. D appealed.