Prasad v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC

2018 WL 4599645 (2018)

Facts

P submitted an online job application and was hired in May 2016 by D as a property manager. P suffers from type I diabetes and generally, was able to perform her work duties, but occasionally required certain accommodations, such as a modified work schedule. Due in part to lengthy work hours, she began experiencing health complications related to her diabetes. P was placed on medical leave and upon her return, her position was filled by another employee, and that she was given a new position as a 'Roving Manager.' The job was temporary in nature and she earned less money than she did as a property manager. P filed a putative class, collective, and representative action against D. D moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the IRA. The IRA states: I will settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for employment, employment, and/or cessation of employment with D exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator. By way of example only, such claims include claims under federal, state and local statutory or common law, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including the amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans With Disabilities Act, state and federal anti-discrimination statutes, the law of contract, and law of tort. The IRA also contains a class action waiver: 'Each arbitration proceeding shall cover the claims of only one Employee. Unless the parties mutually agree, the parties agree that the arbitrator has no authority to adjudicate a 'class action.'' P claims that she never signed the IRA and that the Agreement is unenforceable and unconscionable.  The Supreme Court ruled in Epic that waivers of class actions were not illegal. P concedes she cannot maintain the class, collective and representative claims asserted in her original complaint. P asserts that the IRA is unconscionable for other reasons. D maintains that the IRA is neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable and if they are incorrect that those provisions may be severed from the Agreement and that the remainder is enforceable.