Porn v. National Grange Mutual Life Insurance Company

93 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1996)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

On July 17, 1990, P, a Connecticut resident, was involved in an automobile accident in Portland, Maine, when motorist Lori Willoughby sped through a stop sign and broadsided his vehicle. Because his damages exceeded Willoughby's $20,000 policy limit, P made a claim to D under his automobile policy seeking recovery from the underinsured motorist indorsement to the policy. D refused to pay the claim. Eventually, P filed suit against D in Maine's federal district court for breach of the insurance contract ('first action'). The magistrate judge entered judgment as a matter of law for P on the issue of contributory negligence, and the jury returned a verdict for P, finding that Willoughby's negligence had caused him $400,000 worth of damages. After reducing the jury's award to reflect P's $300,000 underinsured motorist policy limit and appropriate set-offs, the magistrate judge entered judgment for P in the amount of $255,314.40. The magistrate judge denied P's motion for prejudgment interest, finding that while Maine law allows prejudgment interest in excess of the policy limit where the insurer acted in bad faith and needlessly prolonged the litigation, P had presented no evidence that D exhibited such behavior. Six months later, P sued D in Maine's federal district court ('second action'). P alleged that D's conduct in handling his underinsured motorist claim constituted breach of the covenant of good faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. D moved for summary judgment, arguing that the judgment in the first action precluded Porn from bringing the second action. The district court accepted that argument and granted summary judgment in favor of D on the grounds that (1) one aspect of P's bad-faith claim was barred by issue preclusion and (2) all of P's claims were barred by claim preclusion. P appealed.