Poole v. Textron, Inc.

192 F.R.D. 494 (D.Md. 2000)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

This is a product liability case in which P sued D for alleged defects in a golf cart, which resulted in serious injuries to him. The trial judge referred all discovery disputes to this Magistrate. By Memorandum and Order dated May 20, 1999, after a hearing, P was granted three discovery motions which ordered D to do substantial additional investigation to respond to P's discovery requests and held sub curia the request for attorneys' fees or other sanctions pending further submissions and completion of the specified remedial actions. D filed with the trial judge objections to several of the discovery rulings, which the trial judge rejected, affirming the discovery rulings below. At the request of D, a further hearing was held on the request for attorneys' fees, costs, and other sanctions, after which the parties submitted affidavits on the time expended and the appropriate hourly rate for the requested attorneys' fees. The matter is now ripe for decision. Before the Court is P's request for attorneys' fees and other expenses related to the three substantive discovery motions and other sanctions: the motion for sanctions raising six instances of discovery abuse, the motion to compel production of documents and the motion to determine sufficiency of answers and objections to requests for admissions. This Court has already ruled on the merits of these three motions. The current issue facing the Court is whether an award of expenses including attorneys' fees or other sanction is justified under the governing rules and case law and if so, the amount of expenses or sanction. D argues that an award of fees is inappropriate for several reasons. D argues that its collection and investigative efforts to comply with the Court's May 20, 1999 Order were both extensive and expensive -- costing D $23,260 in attorneys' fees and expenses. That 'sanction' is, in D's view, sufficient. D argues that P's request for expenses, including fees, in the amount of $50,346.89 is grossly excessive, under governing law. D objects to the hourly rate charged by P's counsel as not in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.