People v. Wetmore

22 Cal.3d 318, 149 Cal.Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308 (1978)

Facts

Joseph Cacciatore testified that he left his apartment on March 7, 1975. When he returned three days later, he discovered D in his apartment. D was wearing Cacciatore's clothes and cooking his food. The lock on the front door had been broken; the apartment lay in a shambles. Cacciatore called the police, who arrested D for burglary. Later Cacciatore discovered that a ring, a watch, a credit card, and items of clothing were missing. Psychiatric reports submitted to the court explain D's long history of psychotic illness, including at least 10 occasions of hospital confinement for treatment. According to the history, D, shortly after his last release from Brentwood Veteran's Hospital, found himself with no place to go. He began to believe that he 'owned' property, and was 'directed' to Cacciatore's apartment. When he found the door unlocked, he was sure he owned the apartment. He entered, rearranged the apartment, destroyed some advertising he felt was inappropriate, and put on Cacciatore's clothes. When the police arrived, D was shocked and embarrassed, and only then understood that he did not own the apartment. D pled not guilty to a charge of burglary and requested court appointment of a psychiatrist to advise him whether to enter a plea based on insanity. After receiving the report from Dr. John Woodward, D entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court then appointed Drs. Michael Colburn and Marshall Cherkas to examine D. When called for trial D personally and all counsel waived trial by jury and stipulated that the cause be submitted on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, which contained only the testimony of Cacciatore, and the reports of Drs. Colburn and Cherkas. D pointed out that burglary requires an entry with specific intent to commit larceny or felony. D argued that the reports of Drs. Colburn and Cherkas indicated that D entered the apartment under the delusion that he owned the apartment and its contents; he thus had no intent to commit theft or any felony. The court stated that 'if a defendant's mental capacity which would preclude the forming of a specific intent is that of insanity,' that mental condition is 'not admissible to establish the question of lack of specific intent due to diminished capacity.' It found D guilty of second-degree burglary. The court found on the basis of the psychiatric reports that D was insane under the M'Naghten test and, hence, not guilty by reason of insanity. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court found that defendant had not recovered his sanity. The court, therefore, ordered D committed. D appeals from the order of commitment.