People v. Skinner

39 Cal. 3d 765 (1985)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D strangled his wife while he was on a day pass from the Camarillo State Hospital at which he was a patient. D entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. D entered into evidence the opinion of a clinical and forensic psychologist that D suffered from either classical paranoic schizophrenia or schizoaffective illness with significant paranoid features. A delusional product of this illness was a belief held by D that the marriage vow 'till death do us part' bestows on a marital partner a God-given right to kill the other partner who has violated or was inclined to violate the marital vows and that because the vows reflect the direct wishes of God, the killing is with complete moral and criminal impunity. The act is not wrongful because it is sanctified by the will and desire of God. D knew the nature and quality of his act. He knew that his act was homicidal. He was unable to distinguish right and wrong in that he did not know that this particular killing was wrongful or criminal. D knew the nature and quality of his act. He knew that his act was homicidal. He was unable to distinguish right and wrong in that he did not know that this particular killing was wrongful or criminal. The legal definition of insanity under section 25(b) was as follows: …the accused person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense. The judge held that by the use of the conjunctive 'and' in section 25(b), the electorate demonstrated an intent to establish a stricter test of legal insanity than the M'Naghten test, and to 'virtually eliminate' insanity as a defense, the judge found that defendant had not established that he was legally insane. The court read the statute as written and found and found D guilty of second-degree murder. D appealed. D claims that the purpose of the electorate in adopting section 25(b) was to restore the M'Naghten test. The People do not dispute the proposition that the intent of the electorate was to reinstate the M'Naghten test of legal insanity.