People v. Sargent

19 Cal. App. 4th 1209 (1999)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Michael, Sargent's (D) son, was born three months premature. He weighed two pounds, four ounces, and spent the first three months of his life in the hospital. By August 19, 1993, Michael was the equivalent of a four to six-week-old infant in terms of neck muscle development. Paramedics responding to a '911' call found Michael in a deep coma and close to death on F's apartment floor. He was not breathing, had no heartbeat, no eye or motor movement, and no response to verbal stimuli. There was bright red blood coming from his nose and mouth. Michael survived and was released from the hospital on September 3, 1993. D's explanation of the incident changed many times. It evolved from Michael falling off the couch to being dropped on the floor. Interviewing officers told D a consulting physician had concluded Michael was a victim of shaken baby syndrome. D initially denied Michael was ever shaken. He then changed his story a third time. Michael continued crying, and D shook him front to back as Michael sat in his car seat. When Michael continued to cry and refused a pacifier, 'that's when I was shaking him more hard.' D shook Michael four or five times, causing the infant's head to lose contact with the car seat 'a couple of times.' Michael stopped crying. He 'had this weird look in his eyes ... like [he] was going to sleep you know like he was falling or something.' When D picked him up, Michael's back bowed. His eyes closed, and he appeared to have difficulty breathing. D was charged with felony child abuse. At trial, Dr. John McCann, a pediatrician, and director of the Davis Medical Center's child protection program testified that Michael was a victim of shaken baby syndrome. McCann stated that shaking Michael was a circumstance likely to result in great bodily injury or death. For a fall to have caused the injuries sustained, Michael would have to fall out a second story window, not off the couch or from D's arms. Dr. Todd Brandtman testified as a defense medical expert that Michael's injuries could have resulted from being dropped and that photographs of Michael taken two days after he left the hospital showed a swollen spot on the back of his head. The jury was instructed that it could find defendant guilty of violating section 273a(1) based on general criminal intent if it found defendant willfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on Michael. The jury was required to find the infliction occurred under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death. They were instructed that a violation of section 273a(1) required criminal negligence. Both general criminal intent and criminal negligence were defined. The jury found D guilty of a violation of section 273a(1). The Court of Appeal, with one justice dissenting, concluded criminal negligence must be demonstrated to convict a defendant of infliction of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, and the evidence did not support the inference that defendant was criminally negligent. It concluded that 'there is nothing in the record from which it can be inferred that D knew or should have known of the risk of great bodily harm or death from shaking the infant, e.g., attendance at a prenatal education session concerning this risk.... Nor can we take judicial notice that such a risk is generally known. It concluded that 'defendant was convicted under the second branch of section [273a(1)], the 'inflict[ion of] ... unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering' upon a child 'under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death ....' 'The State appealed.