People v. Iniguez

872 P.2d 1183 (1994)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

The night before her wedding, Mercy went to the home of Sandra S., a close family friend whom Mercy had known for at least 12 years and considered an aunt. Sandra had sewn Mercy's wedding dress and was to stand in at the wedding the next day for Mercy's mother who was unable to attend. Mercy was planning to spend the night at her home. Mercy met D, Sandra's fiancée, for the first time that evening. D was scheduled to stand in for Mercy's father during the wedding. D had been drinking. D had consumed a couple of beers and a pint of Southern Comfort before arriving at Sandra's. Mercy, Sandra, and D celebrated Mercy's impending wedding by having dinner and drinking some wine. There was no sexual chemistry of any kind between D and Mercy at any time during the evening. Mercy went to bed in the living room. She slept on top of her sleeping bag. She was wearing pants with an attached skirt, and a shirt. She fell asleep at approximately midnight. Mercy was awakened between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. when she heard some movements behind her. She was lying on her stomach and saw D, who was naked, approach her from behind. D pulled down her pants, fondled her buttocks, and inserted his penis inside her. Mercy weighed 105 pounds. Defendant weighed approximately 205 pounds. Mercy 'was afraid, so I just laid there.' Less than a minute later, D ejaculated, got off her and walked back to the bedroom. Mercy had not consented to any sexual contact. Mercy told police she had not resist D's sexual assault because 'She said she knew that the man had been drinking. She hadn't met him before; he was a complete stranger to her. When she realized what was going on, she said she panicked, she froze. She was afraid that if she said or did anything, his reaction could be of a violent nature. So, she decided just to lay still, wait until it was over with and then get out of the house as quickly as she could and get to her fiancée [sic] and tell him what happened.' Mercy immediately telephoned her fiancée Gary and left a message for him. She then telephoned her best friend Pam, who testified that Mercy was so distraught she was barely comprehensible. Mercy asked Pam to pick her up, grabbed her purse and shoes, and ran out of the apartment. Mercy hid in the bushes outside the house for approximately half an hour while waiting for Pam because she was terrified defendant would look for her. Mercy sat on Pam's kitchen floor, her back to the wall, and asked Pam, 'Do I look like the word 'rape' [is] written on [my] face?' Mercy wanted to take a shower because she 'felt dirty,' but was dissuaded by Pam. Pam telephoned Gary, who called the police. Patricia Aiko Lawson, a blood typing and serology expert, testified that there was a large amount of semen present in Mercy's vagina and on the crotch area of her underpants. A deep vaginal swab revealed that many sperm were whole, indicating intercourse had occurred within a few hours prior to the rape examination. ABO blood group, blood type B, which was consistent with defendant's, but not Gary's or Mercy's blood type, was found on the internal and external vaginal swabs and the underpants. Mercy and Gary married. Neither Sandra nor D participated in the wedding. D was arrested the same day. D admitted to sexual intercourse. D conceded at trial that the sexual intercourse was nonconsensual. D argued that the element of force or fear was absent. The court instructed in relevant part, ' 'Fear' means, a feeling of alarm or disquiet caused by the expectation of danger, pain, disaster or the like.' 'Verbal threats are not critical to a finding of fear of unlawful injury, threats can be implied from the circumstances or inferred from the assailant's conduct. A victim may entertain a reasonable fear even where the assailant does not threaten by words or deed.' The jury found D guilty of rape. The Court of Appeal reversed: there was insufficient evidence that the act of sexual intercourse was accomplished by means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury. It held that D did nothing to suggest that he intended to injure her. D's conviction was reduced to the offense of sexual battery, and she could have easily screamed for help that was available in the next room.