Pearson v. Callahan

555 U.S. 223 (2009)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Bartholomew became an informant for a drug task force after having been charged with the unlawful possession of methamphetamine. Bartholomew informed Officer Whatcott that Callahan (P) had arranged to sell Bartholomew methamphetamine later that day. Bartholomew arrived at P's residence, went inside, and confirmed that P had methamphetamine available for sale. Bartholomew then told P that he needed to obtain money to make his purchase and left. Bartholomew met with the police and told them that he would be able to buy a gram of methamphetamine for $100. Bartholomew was searched for drugs, given a marked $100 bill, and a concealed electronic transmitter to monitor his conversations. Bartholomew agreed on a signal that he would give after completing the purchase. Bartholomew arrived at P's trailer home, and P's daughter let him inside. P then retrieved a large bag containing methamphetamine from his freezer and sold Bartholomew a gram of methamphetamine, which he put into a small plastic bag. Bartholomew gave the arrest signal and the officers entered the trailer through a porch door. The officers encountered Bartholomew, P, and two other persons, and they saw P drop a plastic bag, which they later determined contained methamphetamine. The officers conducted a protective sweep. The officers recovered the marked bill from P and a small bag containing methamphetamine from Bartholomew. P was charged with the unlawful possession and distribution of methamphetamine. The court held that the warrantless arrest and search were supported by exigent circumstances. P was convicted. On appeal, the Utah attorney general conceded the absence of exigent circumstances but claimed that the inevitable discovery doctrine justified the introduction of the fruits of the warrantless search. The Utah Court of Appeals disagreed and vacated P's conviction. P brought this damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment for entering his home without a warrant. Ds moved for summary judgment. Under the 'consent-once-removed' doctrine, a warrantless entry by police officers into a home when consent to enter has already been granted to an undercover officer or informant who has observed contraband in plain view the search was valid. The court held the doctrine may be invalid but it didn’t matter. The court then held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they could reasonably have believed that the consent-once-removed doctrine authorized their conduct. On appeal, the court held that Ds' conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. The majority took no issue with application of the doctrine when the initial consent was granted to an undercover law enforcement officer, but the majority disagreed with decisions that 'broaden this doctrine to grant informants the same capabilities as undercover officers.' The court then held that Ds could not reasonably have believed that their conduct was lawful because they 'knew (1) they had no warrant; (2) P had not consented to their entry; and (3) P's consent to the entry of an informant could not reasonably be interpreted to extend to them.' It was held that Ds were not entitled to qualified immunity. Ds appealed.