Parsons v. State

2 So. 854 (1887)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

The indictment charged Nancy J. Parsons and Joe Parsons (Ds), unlawfully and with malice aforethought in the killing of Bennett Parsons, by shooting him with a gun. Ds murdered Bennett on January 31, 1885. Joe (D) was, at the time of said killing, and had always been, an idiot; and Nancy (D) was, at the time of said killing, insane; that the act of Nancy (D), assisting in the killing of deceased, was the result of an insane delusion that deceased possessed supernatural power to inflict her with disease, and power by means of a supernatural trick to take her life; that deceased by means of such supernatural power had caused said Nancy (D) to be sick and in bad health for a long time, and that her act, at the time, in assisting therein, was under the insane delusion that she was in great danger of the loss of her life from deceased, to be affected by a supernatural trick. Nancy (D) was the wife and Joe (D) was the daughter of the deceased. The evidence also tended to show insanity for two generations in the families of D. Joe (D) offered to prove, by Mrs. James Nail, that 'she had known Joe Parsons from her infancy, that she has been idiotic all her life, and she is idiotic now; and that she has seen her frequently during her acquaintance with her, and has often conversed with her.' P objected to the introduction of said evidence, which objection the court sustained, and Ds excepted. The court sua sponte charged the jury that, 'when insanity is relied on as a defense to crime, and such insanity consists of a delusion merely, and the defendant is not shown to be otherwise insane, then such delusion is no justification or excuse of homicide, unless the perpetrator was insanely deluded into the belief of the existence of a fact or state of facts which, if true, would justify or excuse the homicide under the law applicable to sane persons.' Ds excepted to the giving of this charge. The court charged, at the request of P, to which Ds duly excepted: '(2) It is only insanity of a chronic or permanent nature which, on being proved, is presumed to continue; there to no presumption that fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are continuous.' '(5) If the jury believe, from all the testimony, that the defendants at the time of the killing were in such a state of mind as to know that the act they were committing was unlawful and morally wrong, they are responsible as a sane person, if the jury believe they committed the act with which they are charged.' The court refused to give D's charges: '(6) In order to constitute a crime, the accused must have memory and intelligence sufficient to know that the act she is about to commit is wrong, to remember and understand that if she commits the act she will be punished, and, besides this, reason and will to enable her to comprehend and choose between the supposed advantage at the gratification to be obtained by the criminal act and the immunity from punishment which she will secure from abstaining from it.' '(8) If the jury believe from the evidence that the prisoners or either of them was moved to action by an insane impulse controlling their will or their judgment, then they are, or the one so affected is, not guilty of the crime charged.' '(12) If the jury believe from the evidence that the prisoners committed the act in a manner which would be criminal and unlawful, if they were sane, the verdict should be 'not guilty,' If the killing was an offspring or product of mental disease in the prisoner.' Ds were found guilty of murder in the second degree and appealed.