Palmer v. Krueger

897 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir. 1990)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Virginia and her husband, Bill -- a licensed pilot -- took off in their Beech Bonanza A-36 airplane. Bill piloted the plane. The evening was clear, with winds gusting from twenty to twenty-seven knots from the south. Bill had originally purchased the airplane to fly for pleasure, but later made use of it in a business that he and Virginia owned jointly. Less than two minutes after takeoff, Bill radioed that he would be returning for a landing. The air traffic controller asked if there was trouble. Bill answered 'negative.' Upon its re-approach, the plane turned and disappeared behind a row of trees in an apparent nosedive. Immediately thereafter, the plane crashed and exploded into flames some one thousand feet from the runway. Both of the Kruegers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. P, daughter of Virginia was plaintiff below in this wrongful death action, which arose from her mother's death in the airplane crash. P asserted claims for negligence against Bill's estate, and negligence and products liability against the aircraft manufacturer, Beech. The executor of Bill's estate -- and son of Bill, D -- denied negligence and exclusive control of the airplane. D asserted affirmative defenses of sudden emergency, assumption of the risk, unavoidable accident, and contributory negligence. Beech denied negligence and the presence of a defect at the time the airplane left its control. Beech also asserted the supervening negligence of the pilot and third parties over whom Beech had no control, as well as the defenses of misuse, assumption of the risk, and contributory negligence. P's expert testified at trial that he believed the airplane door was open when the crash occurred. No conclusive evidence was introduced as to the cause of the accident. During trial the court refused to allow P to cross-examine and rebut D about the source of tension between the P and D families, following an exchange between D and his counsel on direct examination of D. P argues that cross-examination and rebuttal are critical to her case, due to the importance of impeaching D. After a statement about the 'morality' of the instant lawsuit was made, P's counsel promptly objected. Objection was sustained, and the jury was admonished not to consider the statement. P's counsel made the following offer of proof about the animosity between the parties when D refused to share the insurance proceeds from the crash and when D made unkind remarks about P’s mother. The trial court denied cross-examination on this issue. The court held that the probative value if there was any at all with regard to those matters, was so small, and the certainty of, in my judgment, the injection of the subject of insurance in this trial was so great that the probative value, if any, was dramatically outweighed by the undue prejudice that would have resulted if insurance had been brought into the case. D got the verdict and P appealed after a motion for a new trial was denied.