D was charged with manslaughter. At trial, P's original theories of causation were, alternatively, (1) a 'combined direct effect,' or (2) an 'aggravation' theory. P called medical examiners who both testified that Jeffrey's death was caused by intra-abdominal hemorrhage and acute peritonitis, occurring as a result of blunt force trauma to the front of the abdomen. Each pathologist identified two distinct injuries, one caused more than twenty-four hours before death, and one inflicted less than twenty-four hours before death. One doctor could not separate the effects of the two injuries. In his view, it was possible that both the older and more recent hemorrhage could have contributed to the death of the child, but he was unable to tell which of the hemorrhages caused the death of the child. The other doctor was of the opinion that the earlier injury was the underlying cause of death. According to him, the later injury, i.e., the second hemorrhage, 'was an aggravating, and probably some factors [sic] contributing,' but it was the earlier injury that was the plain underlying cause of death. The second doctor do not know if D's infliction hastened death. D moved for judgment of acquittal at the end of the State's case-in-chief. The Trial Court denied his motion. Codefendant Tyree called Dr. Hofman, a medical examiner, who disagreed about the number of injuries. He perceived only one injury inflicted about twelve hours before death. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked Hofman the following hypothetical question that assumed two blows when Hofman only testified as to one blow stating that the second blow certainly would have an impact on shortening this child's life. D again moved for judgment of acquittal. The Trial Court denied the motion. and instructed the jury on the elements of recklessness, causation and on various lesser included offenses. The ultimate and only theory of causation on which the jury was charged was based on 'acceleration.' The Trial Court instructed the jury that 'a defendant who causes the death of another . . . is not relieved of responsibility for causing the death if another later injury accelerates, that is, hastens the death of the other person. Contribution without acceleration is not sufficient.' D and Tyree were both convicted. D appealed.