New York v. Kaplan

556 N.E.2d 415 (1990)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Police investigated a cocaine ring, which operated out of an office maintained by D's cousin, Mike Kaplan, in the Empire State Building. Detective Grasso, posing as a drug courier for someone named 'Ronnie' engaged in a series of transactions, primarily with Mike Kaplan. On October 15, 1986, Grasso went to Kaplan's office to purchase 10 ounces of cocaine and found Kaplan, Kaplan's brother, and D. After introducing Grasso to the other two men, Mike Kaplan told defendant 'to take care of the young lady.' Defendant got off the couch, walked to a file cabinet in the room, removed a manila envelope from it, and placed it on the desk in front of Grasso. She, in turn, took out $15,000 in prerecorded buy money and placed it on the table. D picked up the money, took it over to the table and began counting it. At the same time, Grasso opened the manila envelope, took out a zip-lock plastic bag, and placed the drugs into her purse remarking that 'it looks nice.' D was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance. D asked the court to instruct the jurors that in order to convict D as an accomplice they must find that he had 'specific intent' to sell a controlled substance and that he had to 'share the intent or purpose of the principal actors.' The court denied the request, noting that the mental culpability required for criminal sale was 'knowledge' and, further, that the standard charge for accomplice liability requires proof that the defendant 'intentionally aided' the other participants. Following the court's charge. D was found guilty and the appeals court affirmed. D appealed. A person may be held criminally liable as an accomplice when he performs certain acts and does so 'with the mental culpability required for the commission' of the substantive crime. D argues that even though the substantive crime with which he was charged requires only knowledge, the statute should be construed to require proof of a more exacting mens rea, namely specific intent to sell.