D operated a motor vehicle, and the decedent was driving a motorcycle on which his friend, Kevin Coffin, was riding as a passenger. Decedent and Coffin had just left the scene of a fight when they noticed behind them an automobile driven by D. In an effort to lose D, decedent entered a highway and later turned onto an asphalt road, traveling at 85 miles per hour. D continued to follow the motorcycle at a distance of about 50 to 75 feet. In his deposition, Coffin said that 'at one point, they got really close. And I got scared, so I turned around and hit the hood of the car with my hand.' The automobile was at that time about 1 or 2 feet behind the motorcycle. After Coffin hit the hood D backed off, sped up, and hit the motorcycle. The two vehicles locked together and decedent tried to maintain control, for about 268 feet over a period of approximately 5 seconds until the motorcycle struck a light post, fell, and went under the automobile. Decedent was crushed by D's automobile and death was instantaneous. A psychiatrist offered to testify that in his opinion decedent understood he was going to be run down from the moment the automobile made contact with the motorcycle and that he 'must have been absolutely terrified,' knowing or thinking that he was going to die for whatever period of time intervened between the two vehicles' coming together and death. The P's treating physician offered to testify that he thought she suffered from endogenous depression and acute anxiety caused in part by the loss of the decedent, who was her son. This testimony was prohibited by a motion in limine. D admitted that his negligence proximately caused decedent Nelson's death. The jury returned a verdict for P. P appeals, asserting that she should have been allowed to present evidence concerning (1) the mental anguish suffered by P, the next of kin of the decedent and (2) the mental anguish suffered by the decedent.