Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart

427 U.S. 539 (1976)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

A County Court judge, Stuart (D), issued a restraining order related to matters set for trial. D heard oral argument, but took no evidence; no attorney for members of the press appeared. Nebraska (P), several press and broadcast associations, publishers, and individual reporters, moved for leave to intervene, asking that the restrictive order imposed be vacated. D granted Ps’ motion to intervene but found, 'because of the nature of the crimes charged in the complaint that there, is a clear and present danger that pretrial publicity could impinge upon the defendant's right to a fair trial.' The order applied until the jury was impaneled, and specifically prohibited petitioners from reporting five subjects: (1) the existence or contents of a confession Simants had made to law enforcement officers, which had been introduced in open court at arraignment; (2) the fact or nature of statements Simants had made to other persons; (3) the contents of a note he had written the night of the crime; (4) certain aspects of the medical testimony at the preliminary hearing; and (5) the identity of the victims of the alleged sexual assault and the nature of the assault. It also prohibited reporting the exact nature of the restrictive order itself. Ps applied to the Nebraska Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, a stay, and an expedited appeal from the order. The Nebraska Supreme Court balanced the 'heavy presumption against . . . constitutional validity' that an order restraining publication bears against the importance of the defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury. Both society and Simants (D1, the criminal defendant) had a right to be tried by an impartial jury. Because of the publicity D1, had a vital interest in assuring that his right to trial by an impartial jury was in jeopardy. The court then modified the District Court's order to accommodate D1's right to a fair trial and Ps’ interest in reporting pretrial events. The order now prohibited reporting of only three matters: (a) the existence and nature of any confessions or admissions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers, (b) any confessions or admissions made to any third parties, except members of the press, and (c) other facts 'strongly implicative' of the accused. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.