Murdock v. City Of Memphis

87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875)

Purchase the Printed Copy at bsmsphd.com

Nature of the Case

To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.

Facts

P filed a bill in one of the courts of chancery of Tennessee, against D. P stated the following facts: In July 1844, -- Congress having just previously authorized the establishment of a naval depot in that city, and appropriated a considerable sum of money for the purpose -- the ancestors of P -- by ordinary deed of bargain and sale, without any covenants or declaration of trust on which the land was to be held D, but referring to the fact of 'the location of the naval depot lately established by the United States at said town' -- conveyed to D certain land described in and near its limits 'for the location of the naval depot aforesaid.' Both the grantors and D conveyed the same land to one Wheatley, in fee, in trust for the grantors and their heirs, 'in case the same shall not be appropriated by the United States for that purpose.' On the 14th of September, 1844, D, in consideration of the sum of $20,000 paid by the United States, conveyed the land to the United States with covenant of general warranty; there being, however, in this deed to the United States no designation of any purpose to which the land was to be applied, nor any conditions precedent or subsequent, or of any kind whatsoever. The United States took possession and erected a naval depot. Ten years later, by an act of August 5th, 1854, the United States transferred the land back to D: 'All the grounds and appurtenances thereunto belonging, known as the Memphis Navy Yard, in Shelby County, Tennessee, be, and the same is hereby, ceded to the mayor and aldermen of the city of Memphis, for the use and benefit of said city.' P claimed the land came within the clause of the deed of July 1844, conveying it to Wheatley in trust; or if not, that it was held by the city in trust for the original grantors. P sought the return of the land. D claimed that the subsequent perpetual occupation of it as a naval depot was not a condition subsequent; and consequently that the abandonment of it as a naval depot was not a breach of a condition such as divested the title so conveyed by the deed. D pleaded the statute of limitations. It also demurred to the bill as seeking to enforce a forfeiture for breach of a condition subsequent. The court sustained the demurrer, decreed that the city had a perfect title to the property against the complainants both under the act of Congress and the statute of limitations, and dismissed the bill. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed. That court held that the act of Congress 'cedes the property in controversy to the mayor and aldermen of the city of Memphis, for the use of the city only, and not in trust for P; and that the complainant takes no benefit under the said act.' P appealed.