Mullany v. Wilbur

421 U.S. 684 (1975)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Maine requires a defendant charged with murder to prove that he acted 'in the heat of passion on sudden provocation' in order to reduce the homicide to manslaughter. In June 1966, a jury found Wilbur (D) guilty of murder. The case against him rested on his own pretrial statement and circumstantial evidence showing that he fatally assaulted Claude Hebert in the latter's hotel room. D claimed that he had attacked Hebert in a frenzy provoked by Hebert's homosexual advance. D offered no evidence but argued that the homicide was not unlawful since D lacked criminal intent. Alternatively, D's counsel asserted that at most the homicide was manslaughter rather than murder since it occurred in the heat of passion provoked by the homosexual assault. The trial court instructed the jury that Maine law recognizes two kinds of homicide, murder, and manslaughter and that these offenses are not subdivided into different degrees. The common elements of both are that the homicide be unlawful - i. e., neither justifiable nor excusable - and that it be intentional. The prosecution is required to prove these elements by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and only if they are so proved is the jury to consider the distinction between murder and manslaughter. The court charged that 'malice aforethought is an essential and indispensable element of the crime of murder,' without which the homicide would be manslaughter. The jury was further instructed, however, that if the prosecution established that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless D proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The court emphasized that 'malice aforethought and heat of passion on sudden provocation are two inconsistent things.' By proving the latter D would negate the former and reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter. The court then concluded its charge with elaborate definitions of 'heat of passion' and 'sudden provocation.' The jury sought reinstruction on the doctrine of implied malice aforethought, and later on the definition of 'heat of passion.' Shortly after the second reinstruction, the jury found D guilty of murder. D appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, arguing that he had been denied due process because he was required to negate the element of malice aforethought by proving that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. D claimed that malice aforethought was an essential element of the crime of murder and the sole element distinguishing murder from manslaughter. D contended, the Supreme Court's decision in Winship requires P to prove the existence of that element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rejected this argument. D petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The District Court ruled that under the statutes murder, and manslaughter are distinct offenses, not different degrees of a single offense. The court further held that 'malice aforethought is made the distinguishing element of the offense of murder, and it is expressly excluded as an element of the offense of manslaughter.' The District Court concluded, Winship requires the prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt; it cannot rely on a presumption of implied malice, which requires D to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). On remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The court found that the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation results in significant differences in the penalties and stigma attaching to conviction. It held that the principles enunciated in Winship control and that to establish murder the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The Court again granted certiorari.