Muckle v. The Superior Court Of San Diego County

102 Cal. App. 4th 218 (2002)

Facts

H and Cassandra (W) met in Georgia, where H lived and worked, and W visited her mother. When Cassandra's mother died in 1988, she moved into her mother's house in Georgia, where she resided continuously until marrying H there in 1989. During their 11-year marriage they lived at various times in Georgia and California, separating and reconciling repeatedly. In July 1998, H purchased a home in Georgia, taking title to it in his name alone. H and W were living in California at the time. In December 1998, H returned to Georgia to live in the house. Shortly thereafter W moved as well. In the spring of 2000, W returned to California and lived in a trailer H bought for her. At some point, she sold the trailer, keeping the proceeds, and filed her petition for dissolution. W served dissolution papers on Andrew in Georgia by substituted service. W claimed as community property both the home H had bought in Georgia while living in California in 1998 and another house in Georgia that had been purchased in 1985 with title in H's name and that of his son Phillip Muckle. H moved to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, to stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum. H stated he was 65 years old, had lived in Georgia continuously since December 1998, had worked and paid taxes in Georgia, had a Georgia driver's license, was registered to vote in Georgia, had no personal or real property in California, and asserted he could not afford to travel to California to litigate. W asserted that H had been a resident of California from January 1998 through December 1998, that the subject property had been bought in Georgia in July 1998, thus making it community property. W eventually conceded there were not enough contacts for personal jurisdiction, but there was 'in rem,' jurisdiction over him to divide his home in Georgia because it was purchased during the marriage while he was living in California. H filed the same 'minimum contacts' standard necessary for personal jurisdiction over a person was also required to exercise in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction when property rights were asserted. W argued that H had sufficient minimum contacts with California due to his 'purposeful availment' of privileges of conducting activities in California by residing and working in California for over 10 years before returning to Georgia in 1998, by filing and receiving $150,000 on a workers' compensation claim against his Escondido employer, by using $70,000 of those funds for his down payment on the property he purchased in Georgia while the parties were married and lived in California, and by traveling from Georgia to California on numerous occasions. W did not support her allegations with evidence. The court agreed with W and used her allegations to show minimum contacts. H filed a writ of mandate.