A Florida state statute directs newspapers which print negative commentary on one's candidacy for public office, to provide publishing access to candidates to rebut the newspaper's criticism. The candidate's response is published at no cost and must be given the same length that the original statement was given. The statute imposes a criminal fine on any newspaper which fails to comply. The Appellant (D), a newspaper publisher, criticized Appellee Tornillo, a candidate for state legislative office. Tornillo's request to the Appellant to publish an article to address these comments was rejected. Tornillo (P) pursued injunctive relief and D pursued declaratory relief to declare the Florida law unconstitutional under the First Amendment. D also argues that statute is unconstitutional because it is vague given it does not specify what particular language would activate the statute. The Circuit Court concluded that dictating what a newspaper must print was no different from dictating what it must not print. The Circuit Judge viewed the statute's vagueness as serving 'to restrict and stifle protected expression.' P's cause was dismissed with prejudice. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed. It held that free speech was enhanced and not abridged by the Florida right-of-reply statute, which in that court's view furthered the 'broad societal interest in the free flow of information to the public.' It also held that the statute is not impermissibly vague; the statute informs 'those who are subject to it as to what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' Civil remedies, including damages, were held to be available under this statute; the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Florida Supreme Court's opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.