Mckesson v. John Doe

Facts

D organized a demonstration in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to protest a shooting by a local police officer. The protesters, allegedly at D’s direction, occupied the highway in front of the police headquarters. As officers began making arrests to clear the highway, an unknown individual threw a “piece of concrete or a similar rock-like object,” striking Officer P in the face. P suffered devastating injuries in the line of duty, including loss of teeth and brain trauma. P sought to recover damages from D on the theory that he negligently staged the protest in a manner that caused the assault. The District Court dismissed the negligence claim as barred by the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It recognized that Louisiana law generally imposes no “‘duty to protect others from the criminal activities of third persons.’” But a jury could plausibly find that D breached his “duty not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party” because “a violent confrontation with a police officer was a foreseeable effect of negligently directing a protest” onto the highway. It held that the First Amendment imposes no barrier to tort liability so long as the rock-throwing incident was “one of the ‘consequences’ of ‘tortious activity,’ which itself was ‘authorized, directed, or ratified’ by D in violation of his duty of care.” The dissent held that P had to establish a “special relationship” before recognizing such a duty under Louisiana law. The dissent doubted that an intentional assault is the “particular risk” for which P could recover for a breach of “Louisiana’s prohibitions on highway-blocking,” which “have as their focus the protection of other motorists.” The dissent deemed the “novel ‘negligent protest’ theory of liability” to be “incompatible with the First Amendment and foreclosed-squarely-by” prior case law.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

© 2007-2024 ABN Study Partner.