Mckaskle v. Wiggins

465 U.S. 168 (1984)

Purchase the Printed Copy at bsmsphd.com

Nature of the Case

To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.

Facts

Wiggins (D) was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment as a recidivist. His conviction was set aside because of a defective indictment. When D was retired, he was again convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Standby counsel were appointed to assist D at both trials. Prior to the first trial, a hearing was held on Ds' motion to proceed pro se. The court granted the motion and appointed two attorneys to act as standby counsel. D objected to their presence. Shortly thereafter, however, counsel asked D how they should conduct themselves at trial, and D expressly requested that they bring appropriate objections directly to the attention of the court, without first consulting him. After the trial, newly appointed counsel discovered that the original indictment was defective, and a new trial was granted. Two months before the second trial began, D filed a request for appointed counsel, stating that he wished to rescind his earlier waiver of counsel. The trial court appointed Benjamin Samples. About a month later D filed an additional request for counsel. The trial court appointed R. Norvell Graham. During pretrial proceedings, D announced that he would be defending himself pro se and he firmly requested that counsel not be allowed to interfere with his presentations to the court. D reaffirmed his desire to proceed pro se objected even to the court's insistence that counsel remain available for consultation. During trial, D interrupted his cross-examination of a witness to consult with Graham off the record. D expressly agreed to allow Graham to conduct voir dire of another witness. D started the next day of trial, June 6, with a request that the trial not proceed in Samples' absence from the courtroom. Later that morning D requested that counsel not be allowed to assist or interrupt, but a short while after D interrupted his own cross-examination of a witness to confer with Samples off the record. When the trial reconvened in the afternoon, D agreed to proceed in Samples' absence. After Samples returned, however, D again interrupted his own cross-examination of a witness to confer with him. Later D insisted that counsel should not initiate private consultations with him. Before the end of the day D once again found occasion to interrupt his own examination of a witness to confer with Samples. On the following day, June 7, D agreed that Graham would make D's opening statement to the jury. On June 8, D was once again willing to have the trial proceed in the absence of one of his standby counsel. Following his conviction, D moved for a new trial. At the July 31 hearing on Ds' motion, he denounced the services standby counsel had provided. He insisted that they had unfairly interfered with his presentation of his defense. D eventually filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. He argued that standby counsel's conduct deprived him of his right to present his own defense, as guaranteed by Faretta. The District Court denied the habeas petition, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed: D's Sixth Amendment right of self-representation was violated by the unsolicited participation of overzealous standby counsel: 'The rule that we establish today is that court-appointed standby counsel is `to be seen, but not heard.' By this, we mean that he is not to compete with the defendant or supersede his defense. Rather, his presence is there for advisory purposes only, to be used or not used as the defendant sees fit.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari.