D is an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer. P, a black citizen of St. Louis, worked for D as a mechanic and laboratory technician from 1956 until August 28, 1964. P was laid off in the course of a general reduction in D's workforce. P, a long-time activist in the civil rights movement, protested vigorously that his discharge and the general hiring practices of D were racially motivated. P and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally stalled their cars on the main roads leading to D's plant for the purpose of blocking access to it at the time of the morning shift change. The drivers of the cars were instructed to line up next to each other completely blocking the intersections or roads. The drivers were also instructed to stop their cars, turn off the engines, pull the emergency brake, raise all windows, lock the doors, and remain in their cars until the police arrived. The plan was to have the cars remain in position for one hour. P participated and his car was towed away by the police, and he was arrested for obstructing traffic. P pleaded guilty to the charge of obstructing traffic and was fined. A 'lock-in' took place wherein a chain and padlock were placed on the front door of a building to prevent the occupants, certain of D's employees, from leaving. Though P apparently knew beforehand of the 'lock-in,' the full extent of his involvement remains uncertain. Three weeks following the 'lock-in,' on July 25, 1965, D publicly advertised for qualified mechanics, P's trade, and P promptly applied for re-employment. D turned down P, basing its rejection on P's participation in the 'stall-in' and 'lock-in.' P filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), claiming that D had refused to rehire him because of his race and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement, in violation of §§ 703 (a)(1) and 704 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-2 (a)(1) and 2000e-3 (a). EEOC made no finding on P's allegation of racial bias under § 703 (a)(1), but it did find reasonable cause to believe D had violated § 704 (a) by refusing to rehire P because of his civil rights activity. After the Commission unsuccessfully attempted to conciliate the dispute, it advised P in March 1968, of his right to institute a civil action in federal court within 30 days. P brought the present action, claiming initially a violation of § 704 (a) and, in an amended complaint, a violation of § 703 (a)(1) as well. The Court dismissed the latter claim of racial discrimination in pon the ground that the Commission had failed to make a determination of reasonable cause to believe that a violation of that section had been committed. The Court also found that D's refusal to rehire P was based solely on his participation in the illegal demonstrations and not on his legitimate civil rights activities. The court concluded that nothing in Title VII or § 704 protected 'such activity as employed by P in the 'stall in' and 'lock in' demonstrations.' The Eighth Circuit affirmed that unlawful protests were not protected activities under § 704 (a), but reversed the dismissal of P's § 703 (a)(1) claim relating to racially discriminatory hiring practices, holding that a prior Commission determination of reasonable cause was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to raising a claim under that section in federal court. The court ordered the case remanded for trial of P's claim under § 703 (a)(1). The majority noted that P had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination; that D's refusal to rehire P rested on 'subjective' criteria which carried little weight in rebutting charges of discrimination; that, though P's participation in the unlawful demonstrations might indicate a lack of a responsible attitude toward performing work for that employer, P should be given the opportunity to demonstrate that D's reasons for refusing to rehire him were mere pretext. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.