Mcculloch v. Commonwealth

514 S.E.2d 797 (1999)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D's wife entered a grocery store bleeding from a stab wound. Two customers saw a man run past the front of the store. They chased him and saw him holding a knife and chased him to a home. The man was D and it was his house. When the police arrived, they found a bloodstained knife in the kitchen sink, and D admitted to them that he stabbed his wife. The trial court appointed Dr. Jerome S. Nichols, a licensed clinical psychologist, to evaluate D's competency to stand trial and mental state at the time of the offense. D was found competent to stand trial and D was sane at the time of the offense. D attempted suicide while in jail. Dr. Nichols found D no longer competent to stand trial. After treatment, the hospital found D competent and returned him for trial. Dr. Nichols again indicated D needed additional treatment. The trial court still continued the case to allow additional medical treatment. D filed an insanity defense notice and P moved for an examination of D. That evaluation found him sane at the time of the offense. D moved for appointment of a psychiatrist to determine sanity at the time of the offense. The court refused. It stated it would reconsider its ruling at any time D presented a factual basis indicating by more than a mere possibility that a second opinion would assist the defense. D also sought to prove insanity through the testimony of lay witnesses who observed his behavior, demeanor, and actions. The court ruled that the affirmative defense of insanity required D to introduce 'into evidence someone's opinion that the defendant is 'insane'... ., [and] all that a lay witness can do is to give observations about facts.' The trial court precluded D from introducing other testimony about his mental condition at the time of the offense. The trial court excluded some lay testimony because it concerned D's conduct and demeanor after the offense was committed. It excluded other testimony because it was impermissible lay opinion. The trial court permitted one lay witness to testify about D's habits before the murder because it corroborated D's testimony. It also permitted D to testify about his state of mind at the time of the offense. D was found guilty and appealed.