Mccullen v. Coakley

Facts

A Massachusetts statute makes it a crime to knowingly stand on a “public way or sidewalk” within 35-feet of an entrance or driveway to any place, other than a hospital, where abortions are performed. The statute was modeled on a similar Colorado law that the Supreme Court had upheld in Hill v. Colorado. Ps engage women approaching the clinics in what they call “sidewalk counseling,” which involves offering information about alternatives to abortion and help pursuing those options. Ps consider it essential to maintain a caring demeanor, a calm tone of voice, and direct eye contact during exchanges. The 35-foot buffer zones have displaced Ps from their previous positions outside a clinic. The buffer zone extends 23 feet down the sidewalk in one direction, 26 feet in the other, and outward just one foot short of the curb. The clinic’s entrance adds another seven feet to the width of the zone. Ps are effectively excluded from a 56-foot-wide expanse of the public sidewalk in front of the clinic. Other Ps at other clinics must now stand either some distance down the sidewalk from the private walkway and driveway or across the street. Ps contend the buffer zones have considerably hampered their counseling efforts. They now have many fewer conversations and have distributed many fewer leaflets since the zones went into effect. Ps sued D and other Commonwealth officials alleging that the statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, both on its face and as applied to them. The District Court denied the facial challenge.  The Court of Appeals upheld the statute as a reasonable “time, place, and manner” regulation under the test set forth in Ward v. Rock Against Racism. It rejected the argument that the Act was substantially overbroad, void for vagueness, and an impermissible prior restraint. The Supreme court eventually granted certiorari. 

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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