Mathis v. Massachusetts Electric Company

565 N.E.2d 1180 (1991)

Facts

P, sixteen years and eight months old, and three of his friends were gathered in front of a house located directly across from P's home. To impress his friends, P began climbing a utility pole, jointly owned by D. The pole was supported by two guy wires. As he climbed the pole, he came in contact with several telephone, cable television, and electrical wires which did not harm him. When Brian reached the top of the utility pole, he grabbed the primary electrical wire and received an electrical shock. Brian fell to the ground. He sustained severe injuries and burns. P filed suit alleging negligence by Ds. The jury found that D violated its duty toward foreseeable child trespassers under G. L. c. 231, § 85Q (1988 ed.). The jury found that P was comparatively negligent with P 75% at fault, while D was 25% at fault. Because P was above 50% he was barred, under the comparative negligence statute, G. L. c. 231, § 85 (1988 ed.), from recovering any damages. The jury found that New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, NET, was not negligent. P moved for a new trial. It was denied. P appealed. Any person who maintains an artificial condition upon his land shall be liable for physical harm to children trespassing thereon if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the landowner knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, (b) the condition is one of which the landowner knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, (c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, (d) the utility to the landowner of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and (e) the landowner fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.' P argues that once the five statutory conditions are met, the owners are strictly liable, and therefore negligence principles are inapplicable.