Nature of the Case
To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.
Facts
In August 2003, a social worker referred allegations to the police that Michael Shatzer, Sr., (D) had sexually abused his 3-year-old son. D was serving a sentence for an unrelated child-sexual abuse offense. An officer reviewed D's Miranda rights and obtained a written waiver of those rights. D had thought the officer was an attorney there to discuss the prior crime for which he was incarcerated. The officer clarified the purpose of his visit, and D declined to speak without an attorney. The officer ended the interview, and shortly thereafter, the police closed the investigation. Two years and six months later, the same social worker referred more specific allegations to the department about the same incident involving D. A detective and a social worker interviewed the victim, then eight years old, who described the incident in more detail. They went to the Roxbury Correctional Institute and interviewed D in a maintenance room outfitted with a desk and three chairs. D was surprised because he thought that the investigation had been closed. The officer then read D his Miranda rights and obtained a written waiver on a standard department form. D denied ordering his son to perform fellatio on him but admitted to masturbating in front of his son from a distance of less than three feet. D agreed to a polygraph examination. At no point during the interrogation did D request to speak with an attorney or refer to his prior refusal to answer questions without one. Five days later they met with D to administer the polygraph examination. After reading D his Miranda rights and obtaining a written waiver, they concluded that D had failed. When questioned, D became upset, started to cry, and incriminated himself by saying, '`I didn't force him. I didn't force him.'' D then requested an attorney, and the interrogation ended. D was charged with second-degree sexual offense, sexual child abuse, second-degree assault, and contributing to conditions rendering a child in need of assistance. D moved to suppress his statements. The motion was denied on grounds that Edwards protections did not apply because D had experienced a break in custody for Miranda purposes between the 2003 and 2006 interrogations. The trial court found D guilty of sexual child abuse of his son. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded. The court held that 'the passage of time alone is insufficient to [end] the protections afforded by Edwards,' and that, assuming, arguendo, a break-in-custody exception to Edwards existed, D's release back into the general prison population between interrogations did not constitute a break in custody. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
Support@ bsmsphd.com
Casebriefs Co