Martin v. City Of Boise

920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Ps are six current or former residents of D, who are homeless or have recently been homeless. The 'Camping Ordinance' makes it a misdemeanor to use 'any of the streets, sidewalks, parks, or public places as a camping place at any time.' The Camping Ordinance defines 'camping' as 'the use of public property as a temporary or permanent place of dwelling, lodging, or residence.' The 'Disorderly Conduct Ordinance' bans 'occupying, lodging, or sleeping in any building, structure, or public place, whether public or private . . . without the permission of the owner or person entitled to possession or in control thereof.' D has a significant and increasing homeless population. There are three homeless shelters in D offering emergency shelter services, all run by private, nonprofit organizations. D's three homeless shelters contain 354 beds and 92 overflow mats for homeless individuals. Each plaintiff was convicted at least once of violating the Camping Ordinance, the Disorderly Conduct Ordinance, or both. Ps filed this action claiming the ordinances violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment and sought damages for those alleged violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After this litigation began, the Boise Police Department promulgated a new 'Special Order,' effective as of January 1, 2010, that prohibited enforcement of either the Camping Ordinance or the Disorderly Conduct Ordinance against any homeless person on public property on any night when no shelter had 'an available overnight space.' The district court granted summary judgment to D. It held that Ps' claims for retrospective relief were barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that their claims for prospective relief were mooted by the Special Order. On appeal, the court remanded holding that the court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment to D on Ps' § 1983 claims. As none of the Ps had raised an Eighth Amendment challenge as a defense to criminal prosecution, nor had any P successfully appealed their conviction, the district court held that all of Ps' claims for retrospective relief were barred by the Heck case. D had amended the ordinances to codify the Special Order's mandate that 'law enforcement officers shall not enforce [the ordinances] when the individual is on public property and there is no available overnight shelter.' The court held that there was no 'credible threat' of future prosecution. Ps appealed.