Manego v. Orleans Board Of Trade

773 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Manego (P) applied for a liquor license and problems developed when a local banker opposed the application because they had repossessed an ice skating rink next to the disco P wanted to open. The banker, Willard, was worried about the serving of liquor near the facility and the increased likelihood of accidents because of drunk drivers. The banker was a member of the Orleans Board of Trade (D) and also its president. D was an organization open to anyone willing to pay the $15 membership fee. D voted to oppose the disco, and a public hearing was held by the Orleans Board of Selectmen of which two members were also members of the Board of Trade. The license was denied. An amusement license met the same fate a week later. A building permit was granted to P, and the bank filed a suit to challenge that issuance. That suit was dropped when the bank sold the rink. The new owner of the rink was obligated to apply for a new license, and he did so with a greatly expanded format of disco roller skating and ballroom dancing. P sued in the Selectmen, the Bank, and Willard under civil rights statutes and the Fair Housing Act claiming that his licenses were denied because of his race. The Fair Housing claims were dismissed, and summary judgment was given on the other claims to Ds. P then sued again, but Ds were the Bank, Willard and the Orleans Board of Trade and this time P alleged antitrust violations under the Sherman Act. This time P tied the bank, Willard, the Board of Trade, and cross-membership with Board of Trade members and the Selectman and the lawsuit challenging the construction. P alleged that these were anticompetitive acts directed at stopping P from competing with the proposed sale of the rink and its new use. Willard and the Bank moved for summary judgment based on res judicata and under the first amendment under Noerr. D moved for judgment under res judicata and argued that there were no genuine issues of fact concerning the alleged conspiracy. The court found the claims against the Bank and Willard were barred by res judicata as the court found that the facts forming P's antitrust claims were the same as those used to justify the civil rights actions. P appealed.