Nature of the Case
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Facts
P has been employed as an attorney in the Criminal Defense Division of D's office in lower Manhattan. In January 1989, an automobile struck P as she was leaving her parked car and dragged her some twenty feet, inflicting near-fatal injuries that included torn muscles, other hard- and soft-tissue wounds, and a dislocated left knee. From the date of the accident until June 1993, P was on disability leave. P underwent multiple reconstructive surgeries and received 'constant' physical therapy. P has been able to walk only by 'using walking devices, including walkers, canes and crutches.' P was able to return to work in June 1993 and has since then performed her job. P continues to suffer from various physical impairments. She wears a brace on her left knee; she cannot stand for extended periods, and she cannot climb or descend stairs without difficulty. Her condition 'severely limits her ability to walk long distances either at one time or during the course of a day' and her general physical stamina is 'significantly less than normal.' Before returning to work, P asked D to accommodate her disability by 'paying for a parking space near her office and the courts in which she would practice.' P stated that she would be unable to take public transportation from her home in New Jersey because such 'commuting would require her to walk distances, climb stairs, and on occasion to remain standing for extended periods of time,' thereby 'overtaxing her limited physical capabilities.' P's physician, an orthopedic and reconstructive plastic surgeon, advised D by letter that such a parking space was 'necessary to enable P to return to work.' P refused to pay for a parking space. Since returning to work, P has spent $300-$520 a month, representing 15-26 percent of her monthly net salary, for a parking space adjacent to her office building. P had also requested that D accord her seniority increases for the entire 4 and 1/2-year period of her disability leave. D agreed to increase Lyons's seniority level, but only by one year rather than by 4 1/2. P sued D claiming D had refused to provide reasonable accommodations for P's disability, thereby violating her rights under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, state law, and municipal law. D moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), contending that the accommodations requested were unreasonable as a matter of law. The district court granted the motion. The complaint was dismissed and P appealed.
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