Lumpkin v. Jordan

57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303 (Ct. App. 1996)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Mayor Jordan (D) appointed Reverend Lumpkin (P) to serve as a member of the Human Rights Commission. P was a Baptist minister, and P and D had known one another for over 15 years, and D was aware that P was a Baptist minister at the time of his appointment to the Commission. On June 26, 1993, the San Francisco Chronicle quoted P as saying: 'It's sad that people have AIDS and what have you, but it says right there in the scripture that the homosexual lifestyle is an abomination against God. So I have to preach that homosexuality is a sin.' Needless to say, D issued a press release announcing that he would not remove P from the Commission. D stated that P 'has a solid and unambiguous record as a member of the Human Rights Commission. As a commissioner, he has protected and advanced gay and lesbian civil rights.' The San Francisco Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution on July 19, 1993, calling for P's resignation or removal from the Commission. The resolution demanded that D 'restore public confidence in the role and mission of the Commission, especially with regards to the ability of the Commission to consider complaints and lead the community toward equality and respect for all lesbian and gay San Franciscans.' D asked P to resign from the Commission. In a press release explaining his decision, Mayor Jordan stated: 'While religious beliefs are constitutionally protected and cannot be the grounds to remove anyone from elected or appointed public office, the direct or indirect advocacy of violence is not, cannot and will not be condoned by this administration . . . . On the grounds of religious freedom and an unblemished record as a Human Rights Commissioner, I have supported Reverend Lumpkin for holding fundamentalist beliefs which are not my own. We part company when those beliefs imply that attacks against anyone can be justified by the scripture or on any other grounds.' P refused to resign, and D removed him. P sued D in state court, but the case was removed to federal court at D's request. An amended complaint was filed in federal court and the City was added as a party. The first cause of action was alleged under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), barring discrimination in employment decisions on the basis of religion. (See Gov. Code, § 12940.) The second cause of action alleged that Ds, acting under color of state law, deprived P of the right to exercise his constitutionally protected religious beliefs as guaranteed by 42 United States Code section 1983. The federal court granted summary judgment to D on all of the causes of action, except for the claims based on FEHA, over which the federal court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. The state FEHA claims were dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. The basis for the court's ruling was that P was a policymaker with the D administration and the removal did not violate his rights under the free exercise clause. D's interest in preventing disruption of the goals of his administration outweighed P's right to religious expression. The court also reasoned that P's removal could not reasonably be construed as sending a message either endorsing or disapproving of religion and that 'his removal was based on secular concerns.' P was removed because his religious beliefs were at odds with the goals of the Commission and disrupted Mayor Jordan's administration.' P refiled his FEHA claim against D and the City in state court. They demurred to the complaint, arguing that the federal summary judgment finding that Reverend Lumpkin's removal from the Commission was motivated by legitimate, as opposed to discriminatory, reasons negated the necessity of a trial on P's state religious discrimination claims. The trial court agreed. The federal order operated as collateral estoppel on this Court on the issue of P's removal for religious belief. As a matter of law, P was removed for a secular purpose and therefore cannot state a claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.' Accordingly, the trial court granted the demurrer to P's complaint without leave to amend. P appealed.