Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.

457 U.S. 922 (1982)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

In 1977, petitioner, a lessee-operator of a truck stop in Virginia, was indebted to his supplier, Edmondson Oil Co., Inc. Edmondson sued on the debt in Virginia state court. Edmondson sought prejudgment attachment of certain of petitioner's property under Va.Code § 8.01-533 (1977). The prejudgment procedure required that Edmondson allege, in an ex parte petition, a belief that petitioner was disposing of or might dispose of his property in order to defeat his creditors. Acting upon that petition, a Clerk of the state court issued a writ of attachment, which was then executed by the County Sheriff. This effectively sequestered petitioner's property, although it was left in his possession. Pursuant to the statute, a hearing on the propriety of the attachment and levy was later conducted. Thirty-four days after the levy, a state trial judge ordered the attachment dismissed because Edmondson had failed to establish the statutory grounds for attachment alleged in the petition. Lugar (P) subsequently brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Edmondson (D) and its president. P alleged that Ds had acted jointly with the State to deprive him of his property without due process of law. The lower courts construed the complaint as alleging a due process violation both from a misuse of the Virginia procedure and from the statutory procedure itself. P sought compensatory and punitive damages. Relying on Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brook the District Court held that the alleged actions of D did not constitute state action. The Court of Appeals affirmed but rejected the District Court's reliance on Flagg Brothers in finding that the requisite state action was missing in this case. The participation of state officers in executing the levy sufficiently distinguished this case from Flagg Brothers. The court held that a private party acts under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 only when there is a usurpation or corruption of official power by the private litigant or a surrender of judicial power to the private litigant in such a way that the independence of the enforcing officer has been compromised to a significant degree. Because the court thought none of these elements were present, the complaint failed to allege conduct under color of state law.