Lester Baldwin v. Fish And Game Commission Of Montana

436 U.S. 371 (1978)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

A Montana resident could purchase a license solely for elk for $4. The nonresident in order to hunt elk was required to purchase a combination license at a cost of $151; this entitled him to take one elk and two deer. For the next season, the Montana resident could purchase a license solely for elk for $9. The nonresident, in order to hunt elk, was required to purchase a combination license at a cost of $225; this entitled him to take one elk, one deer, one black bear, and game birds, and to fish with hook and line. A resident was not required to buy any combination of licenses, but if he did, the cost to him of all the privileges granted by the nonresident combination license was $30. The nonresident thus paid 7 1/2 times as much as the resident, and if the nonresident wished to hunt only elk, he paid 25 times as much as the resident. Baldwin (Ps) instituted the present federal suit for declaratory and injunctive relief and reimbursement, in part, of fees already paid. The complaint asserted violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge District Court by a divided vote, entered judgment denying all relief to Ps. The court concluded that the State has the power to manage and conserve the elk, and, to that end, to make such laws and regulations as are necessary to protect and preserve it. The right asserted by Ps was 'no more than a chance to engage temporarily in a recreational activity in a sister state,' and was 'not fundamental.' Thus, it was not protected as a privilege and an immunity. There is simply no nexus between the right to hunt for sport and the right to speak, the right to vote, the right to travel, the right to pursue a calling. The dissenting judge took issue with the 'ownership theory,' and with any 'special public interest' theory, and emphasized the absence of any cost allocation basis for the license fee differential. He described the majority's posture as one upholding discrimination because political support was thereby generated, and took the position that invidious discrimination was not to be justified by popular disapproval of equal treatment.