Leis v. Flynt

439 U.S. 438 (1979)

Facts

Ds were indicted for multiple violations of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.31 (1975), which prohibits the dissemination of harmful material to minors. Local counsel for Ds presented an entry of counsel form that listed Fahringer and Cambria as counsel for both defendants. Neither lawyer was admitted to practice law in Ohio. The judge presiding at the arraignment routinely endorsed the form but took no other action with respect to the two out-of-state lawyers. Fahringer and Cambria made no application for admission pro hac vice. Judge Morrissey advised local counsel that neither out-of-state lawyer would be allowed to represent Ds. Subsequently, Fahringer and Cambria expressed their interest in representing Ds. Judge Morrissey summarily dismissed the request. Ds commenced a mandamus action in the Ohio Supreme Court seeking to overturn the denial of admission. They also filed an affidavit of bias and prejudice seeking to remove Judge Morrissey from the case. The Ohio court dismissed the mandamus action but did remove Judge Morrissey, stating that while it found no evidence of bias or prejudice, trial before a different judge would avoid even the appearance of impropriety. The new trial judge denied Fahringer and Cambria permission to represent Ds, but he did allow both of them to  work with in-state counsel in preparing the case. Ds filed suit in the United States District Court to enjoin further prosecution of the criminal case until the state trial court held a hearing on the contested pro hac vice application. The court ruled that the lawyers' interest in representing Flynt and Hustler Magazine was a constitutionally protected property right which petitioners had infringed without according the lawyers procedural due process. Further prosecution was enjoined until Ps tendered Fahringer and Cambria the requested hearing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held lawyers could not be denied the privilege of appearing pro hac vice 'without a meaningful hearing, the application of a reasonably clear legal standard and the statement of a rational basis for exclusion.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari.