Lawson v. Halpern-Reiss

212 A.3d 1213 (2019)

Facts

P drove herself to D after lacerating her arm. She arrived at the emergency room at 2:12 a.m. The charge nurse detected a heavy odor of alcohol on P's breath, and it became apparent to the nurse that P had been drinking. Members of the treatment team administered an alco-sensor test to assess P's level of intoxication. The test revealed a breath-alcohol concentration of .215, over two and one-half times the legal limit, at 2:40 a.m. The nurse understood that P did not have a ride home. After her laceration was treated, P was cleared for discharge. She was discharged at 3:05 a.m. Before P was discharged, the charge nurse approached the officer and informed him that P was highly intoxicated, that she had driven herself to the hospital, and that she was about to drive herself home. The officer arrested her on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. The resulting criminal charge was later dismissed by the prosecutor. P sued Ds, alleging that she incurred damages as the result of (1) the nurse's negligent disclosure of information obtained during P's medical treatment, in violation of the standard of care applicable to medical providers; and (2) D's inadequate training and failure to develop policies regarding the disclosure of information obtained during medical treatment. Ds moved for summary judgment. Ds argued in part that this Court has never recognized a duty enforceable in a tort action not to disclose information obtained during medical treatment and that, even if such a duty existed, the nurse's disclosure of information in this case fully complied with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), because it was done to avert an imminent threat to P's and the public's safety. The trial court granted summary judgment in that P had failed to identify any Vermont authority in support of a greater rule of confidentiality than that set forth in HIPAA. The court relied on a HIPAA regulation permitting the disclosure of information based on the presumed good-faith belief that the disclosure was necessary to prevent a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public. P appealed claiming that the trial court erred in holding that there is no common-law remedy for a health care provider's breach of a duty of confidentiality; and (2) assuming there is such a remedy, the court erred in granting D summary judgment insofar as there are material facts in dispute as to whether the nurse breached the duty of confidentiality regarding information obtained during the course of medical treatment.