On December 5, 1884, Anna and her then-husband, J. H. Baker, who was her second husband, executed a deed to Nannie W. Neeley, a daughter of Anna by a former husband, Laughlin, conveying to Nannie a parcel of real estate for the consideration of one dollar and love and affection. The conveyance was made subject to the life estate of Anna. Upon her death, the property was to pass to Nannie during her natural life, to be owned and held by her for her sole and separate estate, free from the debts or control of her husband, and at the death of said Nannie, said property shall pass and belong to the grandchildren of Anne in equal portions. On February 13, 1906, an equity action was filed by Anna, Nannie, and the husband of the latter against all of the then-living grandchildren, and descendants of those who were dead, of Anna to procure a sale of the land conveyed by the 1884 deed for purposes of reinvestment. Anna died testate in 1919 and left surviving her four children, three sons and one daughter, Nannie. In her will, she devised all of her property to her children and to others than her grandchildren or the descendants of any who were dead. Nannie died testate in 1921, and in her will, she devised all of her property, excluding some small special bequests, to her only grandson, John B. Murillo, Jr., with the condition that if he should die without descendants then it should go to others named in the will. He was the only child of a deceased daughter of Nannie and she left no surviving child or other grandchild. The mother of John B. Murillo, Jr., was alive in 1906 and was a party to the reinvestment suit but he, although living at that time, was not a party thereto; nor did the judgment in that case expressly attempt to construe the 1884 deed, or to determine the validity of the clause therein, or those in the reinvestment deeds, conveying the land to the grandchildren of Annie after her death and that of Nannie. This action was filed by some of the grandchildren of Annie against the others, and the surviving children of those who were dead, to obtain a division of the respective parcels of land in which the reinvestment was made. Some of the purchasers filed exceptions in that the limitation to the grandchildren in the 1884 deed, as well as those of the reinvestment deeds, was void because it was repugnant to the rule against perpetuities. This appeal resulted.